AID WITH INTEGRITY

AVOIDING THE POTENTIAL OF HUMANITARIAN AID TO SUSTAIN CONFLICT: A STRATEGY FOR USAID/BHR/OFDA IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

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The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Agency for International Development.

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1. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AND CONTEXT

1.1 Tackling Complex Emergencies

The complications of delivering effective humanitarian aid in a new generation of complex emergencies are the subject of much recent soul-searching.[1] Paramount among concerns is the fear that attempts to deliver aid to relieve suffering and promote peace are often having a paradoxical effect. The external-fueling of such conflicts has become an increasing concern of donor states. Such fears have also been expressed by aid practitioners, whose growing expertise in an accumulation of complex emergencies is serving to guide aid programs away from the most blatant misuse of resources.

However, further refinement of aid measures based on a more sophisticated understanding of their economic and political effects is a universal demand. The perils of aid-looting in Somalia, aid-blockage in Bosnia and distinguishing the wronged from the wrongdoers in Rwanda are not just professional concerns. They are now, rightly, matters of public debate.[2] Failure to confront them openly may undermine public and Congressional support of OFDA, at a time when humanitarian aid compares favorably to a range of other governmental foreign policy activities.[3]

At the outset it is important to distinguish between deliberate and inadvertent sustenance of conflict. The deliberate use of aid to support one warring party against another, now largely a relic of the Cold War, is not the main focus of this paper. Rather it is the unintended abuse or inflammatory nature of aid arising from the political and economic context in which it is delivered or its manner of delivery. Humanitarian aid still carries political and security consequences, intended or incidental, which may subvert its core objective. Identifying such effects demands an analysis which considers not only the recipient country but includes regional and international repercussions.

Causation is an elusive concept. This paper looks to the contributory nature of aid rather than its solo potential to create conflict. For this reason "sustaining" or "exacerbating" rather than "causing" conflict is the dynamic factor to be identified and reduced. Building upon the sum of research to date, this paper is based on the observations of current aid practitioners, many of whom have current or recent positions within OFDA. Many respondents preferred to comment anonymously and therefore go un-sourced. The bulk of the data is synthesized from the authors' field research in the Greater Horn, Angola and West Africa, including many of the largest OFDA programs.[4] Soundings on provisional findings were taken with officials in other regions and with more senior policymakers in agency headquarters.

Where possible, issues and recommendations are accompanied by *italicized examples,* illustrating good or bad practice. Readers comfortable with the assertions or short on time may wish to be selective in their reading of these examples. Any errors of fact or judgment are the responsibility of the authors, although we would encourage reader's comments and suggestions.

1.2 Objective and Goals of the Strategy Paper

The objective of the paper is to establish the conditions under which humanitarian assistance through BHR/OFDA maximizes benefits to victims of war-related emergencies while minimizing the risks of creating, sustaining or escalating conflict.

The goals of the paper are:

1.2.1. **Negative Impacts**: To map out the circumstances under which humanitarian aid may generate, sustain or exacerbate conflict.
1.2.2 **Principles**: To summarize existing norms and codification relevant to minimizing conflict, and their applicability in practice.
1.2.3. **Minimizing Conflict**: To identify humanitarian aid interventions which minimize the escalation of conflict and promote peace-building.
1.2.4. **Managing Wider Agendas**: To review OFDA's unilateral potential to provide "aid with integrity" in accordance with wider political and humanitarian agendas.

1.3 Political and Institutional Context: An End to Aid Naivety?

1.3.1 International donor politics

Humanitarian aid was developed in an age where beneficiaries were identifiable as civilian victims either of natural disasters or conflicts to which they were not party. The post-1990 rash of complex emergencies has upset this framework, especially where victims and belligerent parties are less easy to distinguish and humanitarian aid has become increasingly entangled with the dynamics of conflicts.[5]

The international community has had a vigorous if somewhat erratic response to the post-1990 epidemic of complex emergencies. A variable blend of political-security and humanitarian measures has been applied both in unilateral and multilateral settings. Inevitably the humanitarian objectives of aid have been caught up in their political context. The aid policies of donors, even those purporting to have no political agenda, rarely escape political consequences. Such consequences need to be analyzed at national, regional and international levels.

1.3.2 U.S. Government policies and humanitarian crises

Should humanitarian aid be regarded as a genuine foreign policy initiative or as a palliative, a substitute for more robust political and security action? Despite a high degree of human rights rhetoric at the inception of the current administration, policy appears to be settling into a more conventional pattern. Distinctions are now drawn between crises of "vital national interest" (Kuwait, for example), "important national interest" (Haiti and Bosnia) and those of "humanitarian concern" only (Rwanda).[6] As put by President Clinton, "This era has seen an epidemic of humanitarian catastrophes, many caused by ethnic conflicts or the collapse of governments. Some such as Bosnia, clearly affect our interests. Others, such as Rwanda, less directly affect our own security interests, but still warrant our concern and our assistance."[7] Suggestions that social and environmental "chaos" arising from internal conflicts might be the new focus of foreign policy are premature.[8] Most likely, humanitarian action, including aid, will continue to operate in the wake of the necessities and idiosyncracies of foreign policy decision processes, in particular the outcome of tensions between the administration and Congress.

1.3.3 OFDA's stated role and political sub-agenda

The primary objective of USAID's disaster response program is to save lives and prevent human suffering...additionally, USAID seeks to fashion disaster responses so as to strengthen local institutions' capacity for coping with future emergencies.[9] Within USAID, disaster assistance, coordinated by OFDA, has clearly prescribed objectives to preserve life and minimize suffering, to foster self-sufficiency, and to enhance recovery.[10] The humanitarian imperative is reinforced by the current draft guidelines which focus on the most vulnerable groups and a "well-defined at-risk population."[11]

This is not just rhetoric. The humanitarian culture is well-internalized in the staff. Typical was one desk officer, who in one of the most politicized humanitarian operations in northern Iraq maintained, "Our only role is to make life more comfortable for the Kurds." Yet, there is a political agenda. As former head of OFDA explained: "U.S. foreign disaster assistance has been drawn into an increasingly intimate connection with American foreign policy by the geometric increase in complex humanitarian emergencies, by the growing use of food as a weapon of war and the diplomatic interventions needed to guarantee access to it, by the increasingly intense State Department focus...and by the institutional weakness of the United Nations in responding."[12]

Whether intended or incidental, the political and security implications of OFDA activity necessitate greater attention to context. OFDA officials, although aware of aid's potential to fuel conflict, admitted they had no overt system or criteria for screening aid proposals passing over their desks which could eliminate such outcomes. Much of the evidence cited in this report relates to food aid. Although not technically OFDA's responsibility, food-related activities form a substantial part of its activities. Moreover, OFDA is implicated by association with BHR/Food for Peace, and therefore needs to address the issue head-on.

To achieve humanitarian objectives in complex emergencies many aid agencies have already shed much of their naivety. This strategy paper is intended to contribute to a "new realism" by distilling the recent experience of some very skilled field workers and offering guidelines that will better achieve "aid with integrity."

2. NEGATIVE IMPACTS

Humanitarian aid may unintentionally sustain conflict in two major ways. First, it can be mis-used directly as an instrument of war, providing the *means* for conflict. Second, it may contribute less overtly to the dynamics of conflict, exacerbating the *causes* of insecurity and war. This section will elaborate on these two themes. [13]

It should be noted that these are potential negative impacts, borne out in certain locations after independent assessment by the authors. In no way should this be interpreted as positing that all humanitarian aid has each of these effects. Problems are often specific to locations, as are solutions. The universe of potential obstacles is presented here as a guide for practitioners and policy-makers. Many agencies are fully aware of these warning signals, and are addressing them creatively, as will be seen in following sections.

2.1. Direct Impacts: Aid Abused as an Instrument or Means of War

2.1.1. Manipulation of Access

In many conflicts warring factions deny or block access for humanitarian aid agencies, they control access to serve political or military strategies, and they directly attack relief infrastructure and personnel. Several governments have invoked their sovereignty to attempt to control or deny access to certain parts of their countries, especially areas controlled by rebel forces. Rebels have reciprocated by using violence to limit aid flows into government areas.

Examples: *Throughout the 1980s, the Ethiopian and Sudanese governments limited aid to rebel-held areas, a primary reason for the killing famines in 1984-5 and 1987-88, respectively. In the 1993-4 round of civil war in Angola, both UNITA and the government regularly and strategically denied access to territories occupied by their opponents. In Liberia aid has not only been blocked by warring factions, but by the regional peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, with the approval of the UN secretary general's special representative.*[14] *Bosnia, Somalia and Mozambique were also cited by OFDA officials as clear examples of interference with aid access.*

However, sensitive to charges of using food as a weapon, warring parties have become more sophisticated in their methods. Now, instead of overtly blocking aid to areas of contested control, there is increasing effort to control directly (and benefit from) the access routes to those areas. For example, the government in Sudan is attempting to constrict the southern sector of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) and route all aid through government-held towns, including that aid destined for rebel SPLA-held territory. Governments and rebel groups throughout Africa create or expand humanitarian agencies or closely allied NGOs to capture more aid resources.

Despite the more skilled manipulation, attacks on the humanitarian infrastructure -- assets and personnel -- are increasing rapidly, especially in the form of hostage-taking. Objectives for these attacks include:

- Dissuading agencies from operating in a particular area or serving a particular population
- Forcing agencies (and/or the international community) to recognize the presence or legitimacy of the attacking faction
- Cutting off outside aid to populations who are providing sustenance to opposing authorities
- Ratcheting up of violence to increase the need for agencies to buy into the extortionist protection rackets connected to military authorities. Here again, some authorities are smart enough not to do the dirty work themselves, but rather to hire mercenary militia to do it for them.

Examples: *Renegade rebel commanders are paid for by the government of Sudan to wreak havoc and divert aid in parts of Bahr al-Ghazal and Eastern Equatoria, seriously disrupting the activities of OLS . Sudan is not alone in such examples. In Burundi and northern Uganda, aid agencies have been frequently attacked to divert them from certain areas.*

Humanitarian access agreements may often be exploited to move military assets. Airstrips are sometimes used by military groups only hours after clearance has been given for relief flights to land.(for example, in Sudan) Flight routes into Angolan garrison towns which were part of negotiated access agreements during 1993-4 allowed these towns to be resupplied militarily. Roads that are built or repaired to facilitate the easier and cheaper movement of humanitarian supplies, for example in Bosnia, inevitably facilitate military movements as well.

Humanitarian cease-fires are cynically used by factions to re-deploy and re-arm, while taking the credit from negotiators for their humanitarian gesture.

Example: *The 1995 "guinea worm cease-fire" in southern Sudan negotiated by President Carter in order to expand disease eradication was a clear case of manipulation of humanitarian intent. The government used proxies , such as the Lord's Resistance Army and the West Nile Bank Front, to advance its military aims. Furthermore, a number of towns were taken by government forces, including Pariang, Nasir, and Lafon. Airstrips such as the one in Chotbura were mined, and military assets were redeployed throughout the south by all sides.*

2.1.2. Manipulation of Population Movements

Warring factions regularly use civilians as shields and/or as sources of food and other humanitarian aid for garrisons or training centers. A study by Macrae and Zwi notes that while it is difficult to document--and to overcome donors' reluctance to publicize--abuses in aid provision, governments and military forces do selectively provide aid to current and potential supporters or populations they seek to lure--or drive--to areas they control.[15] One rebel official told an aid worker, "We can lose the NGOs, but we can't lose WFP." Although food may be the primary attraction, other humanitarian aid is coveted such as health supplies and livestock vaccines.

Factions also position civilians or airstrips to enhance the ability of troops or militia to remain in areas that might have to be otherwise abandoned for lack of supplies or difficulty to defend. "They're there by the grace of the relief inputs," remarked one donor official. Whether it's a border area where military resupply occurs, or an interior location which cannot be resupplied by a military group's own logistical capacity, the location of civilian populations are constantly subjected to cost-benefit calculations by authorities. Moreover, the civilian feeding centers or distribution points and the agencies serving them act as a protective cover; when they are attacked, the attack is not just against a military garrison, but also against the entire aid system.[16]

The reasons for these tactics are multiple. Besides the protection afforded by humanitarian operations, reserves of manpower are conveniently drawn upon for fresh recruits for military missions. Leaders are often able to cement themselves to civilian populations through drawing aid providers to a location. Being perceived as being responsible for bringing the aid providers positively affects any semblance of a "hearts and minds" campaign conducted by that authority. The benefits are so great that in some cases warleaders exacerbate malnutrition deliberately to attract more aid.

Examples: *With the Rwandan camps in Zaire, aid helped maintain the former government's control over a population which otherwise might have dispersed or gone home. Some analysts say there are few options when humanitarian need is so great. Others advocate withdrawal after the emergency is ended: "We are the quartermaster for the Hutu militia," commented Andrew Natsios.*[17]

Moving a large displaced population along the Sudan-Uganda and Sudan-Kenya border has enabled SPLA headquarters to constantly be assured of a food supply line in strategic locations from aid agencies serving the displaced. No simultaneous head counts are ever done of all locations where displaced or refugee populations reside, so there is no certainty about the accurate number of beneficiaries. Major trading circles develop around these locations, involving cross-border trade and multiple use of infrastructure for military, humanitarian, and commercial purposes. "We deliver enough food aid to feed most soldiers in Equatoria,"

observes one agency official. John Garang himself allowed that if the displaced population on the Uganda-Sudan border were to move too far away from the Nimule area, that strategic SPLA hub would fall to the government. A similar analysis can be made of the Rwandan relief camps in Zaire, close to the Zaire-Rwandan border.

Mozambique exemplifies the extent of the effect that international relief may have on civil wars: Renamo benefitted from the lack of large-scale aid to government areas in 1986-87, only to see expanding aid subsequently facilitate governmental military control of the north by enabling large populations to leave Renamo areas to live in government areas. Aid bolstered the government's legitimacy, the army's logistical support, and the local economy.[18]

2.1.3. Diversion or Looting of Aid

Warring factions frequently divert humanitarian inputs -- especially food and drugs, given their easy monetization -- for their own consumption, for barter or sale, and even for export. Selling or trading diverted commodities across borders is a principal method of accessing arms. Agencies which are the largest movers of food are often in a constant battle with authorities over the issue of diversion.

Examples: *Again, the experience of* ***Sudan*** *is instructive. By early 1993, it was evident that a pattern had emerged wherein major diversion of food aid by the SPLA-Mainstream faction was a particularly acute problem in the area in which the main garrison was headquartered. For example, at the time it was commonly alleged that one out of every three agency-supplied sacks of grain going to areas of the East Bank, including the Triple A displaced camps, were being diverted by the SRRA, and nearly all the cooking oil was being diverted and sold in Uganda, or traded for petroleum products.*[19] *In late 1992, one head count found about 83,000 displaced in the Triple A camps, despite the SRRA claim of 256,900. UN convoys were suspended in October 1992 after the murders of the relief workers and journalist, but NGOs continued their deliveries.*

This situation was similar to the problems faced during the late 1980s and early 1990s in Sudanese refugee camps in Gambela, Ethiopia, and then from 1991 to 1992, when Torit served as the main garrison for the SPLA-Mainstream and food aid was being taken by the SPLA and traded for tires and fuel. World Vision had to finally suspend its activities in Eastern Equatoria in November 1992, due to "accountability" problems. When Torit was the garrison, World Vision and Catholic Relief Services were constantly attempting to improve monitoring and accountability, and at times had to temporarily suspend operations, such as in November 1991.

The main SPLA splinter faction, now SSIA, also significantly diverts relief supplies. Relief workers who have witnessed numerous distributions in Akobo, Waat, and Ayod suggest that there is regular "taxation" of civilians in the form of a percentage of their relief distribution. This was acknowledged in discussions with SSIA commanders. One relief official described the situation in Nasir in which food was diverted by SPLA-Nasir soldiers going house to house, taking food, medicine and fishing materials, despite the presence of twenty food monitors. More blatant looting has also occurred. One donor government official obtained information that before the SSIA attack on Kongor in late July 1993, they delayed the attack in order to wait for 600 bags of UN grain to be carried to their forward position.

In ***Somalia*** *during 1991-92, major diversion was part of every agency's cost of getting access. But the diversion became so extreme that agency fears grew that it was the major focus, even cause, of conflict. Natsios writes:*

> *Food had become the medium of exchange and a principal source of wealth in Somalia. Because food was so scarce both from drought and civil conflict, its absolute value had*

risen to an extraordinarily high level. This factor combined with the collapse of the economy causing mass unemployment and a dramatic drop in family income increased the relative value of food. This meant food imported through the relief effort became an enormously attractive objective of plunder by merchants, by common working people without a source of income, by organized gangs of young men and by militia leaders in need of the wealth represented by food aid which they would use to purchase more weapons and keep the loyalty of their followers.[20]

In Somalia, de Waal points out other methods of diversion: registering nonexistent villages; forming false committees to represent, and sell food meant for, real villages; and coercing signatures for food deliveries that were in fact diverted. Militia and bandits "looted, pilfered, diverted, or extorted" far more than official ICRC estimates of the amount of aid lost -- over half, some village-level indigenous relief workers claim.[21]

Widespread militia fraud and intimidation distorted refugee registration in ***Rwandan*** *refugee camps, particularly in Kibumba, where it culminated in threats to expatriate staff and MSF-Belgium's pullout in February 1995, and in Ngara, Tanzania, where UNHCR nullified the flawed registrations. Delayed registration aids diversions.*[22] *Zairian Caritas' experience in the Kituku camp shows the importance of credible refugee registration. Rejecting UNHCR population counts, they divided WFP food for an estimated 15,000 into rations for 23,000; rations for 8.000 then went unaccounted for over six months, and refugees received only a fraction of the aid.*[23]

Stealing assets related to relief operations is also a growth industry not only in the Greater Horn region but also in the West African emergency centered on ***Liberia*** *and* ***Sierra Leone****. In particular, militia have looted vehicles and fuel throughout emergency operations to mobilize their hit and run campaigns. However, such looting is often linked to personal gain rather than military objectives, resulting from breakdowns in chain of command and general lawlessness.*

Not only is humanitarian aid misappropriated, but the infrastructure is often utilized by warring parties for purposes far different from those intended by aid providers. In Sudan for example, health workers, after receiving training to prepare them to work with aid agencies, have sometimes been conscripted into military service. Building up the logistical capacity of a relief arm of an authority inevitably builds the capacity of the authority itself.

2.1.4 Other Abuses of Humanitarian Aid

There are a number of ways in which aid inadvertently feeds conflicts by making more resources available to warring parties. Less obvious than diversion or looting, the following phenomena may nevertheless contribute more to the financing of war and support of military authorities, governments and rebels alike.

a) Aid inputs are often "taxed," whether door-to-door, at distribution sites, or at markets.
b) Extortion networks which include bribes, roadblocks, checkpoints and mafia protection rackets are common. The security apparatus that each agency constructed to protect its assets in Somalia are the extreme, in which the demand for security buttressed the demand for weapons, fueling further cycles of rearmament beyond the needs of internal warlord conflict.
c) Dual currency exchange rates are hidden but huge. "All of these others are peanuts compared to the margins made in exchanging currency," says one agency representative. "It's the largest way of underwriting war efforts through aid." One

rebel Ethiopian group, the TPLF, which received foreign exchange to do internal purchase, placed what was in essence a 43% overcharge on their currency exchange, often made in the Middle East.[24] Some governments charge up to four times the market rates and deposit the differences in their treasuries, thereby forcing donors who seek to reduce suffering to "subsidize" continued oppression and violence through funding of predatory regimes.[25]

d) Rents, salaries (direct or "taxed"), fuel, transport contracts, and storage contracts are major sources of foreign currency for warleaders and their financiers. In Somalia, relief agencies could not help not only increasingly enriching the individual gunmen they employed but augmenting contractors and commanders' ability to maintain militia--especially fleets of "technicals"--by controlled gunmen's access to aid work and, thus, loyalty.[26]
e) At an official or pseudo-official level, import duties, licenses, permits, visas, and port/airport charges are also substantial sources of income.
f) Local purchase schemes, in which international agencies buy surplus commodities and transport them to deficit areas, provide foreign exchange to authorities in surplus areas.
g) The inclusion of warring authorities in needs assessments puts agencies at risk of inaccurate information either through misleading translation or intimidation of local people.
h) Aid can unwittingly help maintain black market profiteering, whereby merchant/militia alliances profit from controlled or manipulated scarcity and supply. Often these alliances will block aid to an area or withhold supplies from a market to drive prices up.
i) Providing aid to "indigenous" NGOs acting as fronts for military factions may provide yet another method of accruing resources.

2.2. Contributory Impacts: Humanitarian Aid and the Dynamics of Conflict

What causes internal conflicts to escalate into violence and state-collapse is the subject of much discussion and little agreement. The relationship between international development aid and the root causes of such conflict is equally uncertain and requires separate study. Such analysis is likely to identify different levels of causation. Major donors, it is feared, can heighten conflict by widening gaps between the rich and poor or resource competitors through environmental or structural adjustment policies. Others argue that donors tend also to roll back or weaken the State and its ability to mediate conflicts.[27] By focusing on specific projects, "communities" or "target groups," individual aid agencies may be ignoring deeper issues such as gender, class, or land rights and thereby heighten tensions.

Humanitarian aid, although often arriving late in a conflict, still runs the risk of exacerbating such causes, particularly at a local level. Any such effect should be regarded as a contributory factor: a proximate rather than root cause of conflict.

2.2.1 Increasing Competition in Impoverished Regions and Communities

Humanitarian aid can increase competition and suspicion in resource-scarce environments. Struggles to control relatively huge relief resources are critical to conflict *within* as well as *among* governments, rebel movements, and neighboring communities. Competition is increased when there is a perception (accurate or not) of unbalanced aid or disproportionate agency presence between neighboring regions. Such perceptions may even draw armed elements to relatively secure areas.

Examples: *Following the intercommunal clashes in* ***Kenya's*** *Rift Valley in 1993, there were charges and counter-charges of partiality that fueled suspicions in an already tense environment. The perception of aid imbalances in favor of* ***Rwandan*** *refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania has greatly angered the government in Kigali.* ***Sudan*** *is rife with examples. When Norwegian People's Aid took aid to Didinga and Boya areas in 1993, bypassing Toposa areas, the Toposa threatened to stop all aid traffic until they were factored in. Perceptions by Jikany Nuer leaders of the disproportionate aid benefits accrued by Lau Nuer has helped fuel Jikany cattle raiding. Perceptions of favoritism of Dinka areas over Nuer areas in the late 1980s and early 1990s fuelled Nuer raids into Dinka areas following the split in the southern Sudanese rebel movement in 1991. In* ***Somalia*** *UNOSOM was widely reported to have contributed to imbalances in the Mogadishu economy with their aid and associated contracts, continuously fueling conflict between sub-clan militia. Aid imbalances are constantly cited by Garhajis opposition forces in Somaliland as a fueling factor in their quest to overthrow the government. They claim that most aid assets have gone to serve populations displaced from government-held areas of the territory to the west, while little aid has accessed those displaced from opposition areas until ICRC negotiated a more balanced response. "We don't want to tip regional balances by over-concentrating in stable areas," said one diplomat of operations in Somalia, adding "Will that be potentially destabilizing and create a target?"*

At the village level, the placement of a water well or health post can spark conflict between two communities. Not only the location of a project but also its choice of employees can create tensions. In many zones of conflict, there are perceptions and misperceptions about the ethnic composition of those hired by agencies.

Targeting the most needy-- a desirable professional end -- can inflame tensions when a surrounding community feels slighted. For example, attempting to target vulnerable populations such as refugees rather than doing general distributions may alienate host populations. Relief strategies should support local coping mechanisms but with caution: helping one group survive can burden another. Moving people from war to safety zones, which can support military depopulation strategies, can also lead to competition between displaced and host populations and local resentment of large-scale aid to the displaced.[28] These are obviously exacerbated when there are identity differences between targeted and general populations, such as ethnicity, clan, religion, etc. Targeting within societies, moreover, can exacerbate existing tensions, as aiding the poorest of the poor, or women, necessarily means a denial and reversal of the distributional status quo.[29]

Examples: *In 1995, efforts to target WFP food to vulnerable groups in Kismayu,* ***Somalia,*** *got entangled with issues of payment of guards and led to perceptions within the city that food and medicine was only going to certain segments of the community, leading to violence in the WFP compound and the surrounding area. In Gursum,* ***Ethiopia,*** *Oromo displaced by intercommunal fighting in 1992-93 were resettled in their former areas, and targeted with grain, seeds and tools. This targeting created great resentment of surrounding communities, and in some cases the distributions were physically prevented from being carried out.*

Manipulation or control of aid -- or access to aid agency assets like employment, contracts, and services -- can become a source of conflict. "Large resource inputs create tensions," confirmed one donor official. The study by Macrae and Zwi stresses that aid is not neutral but a political and economic resource often distributed, and thus manipulated and fought over, by the same groups initially responsible for violence and oppression--a process that sustains conflict and reinforces inequalities of power by heightening the current winners' power and wealth through their control of food.[30]

Examples: *In **Liberia**, competing faction leaders reportedly visited aid agencies (funded by OFDA) to lobby for aid for their particular fiefdoms. In southern **Sudan**, part of the rationale for rebel factionalism is to seek to be a direct recipient of internationally provided aid as a "faction" controlling an area. After the first split in 1991 which OLS formally recognized fairly quickly, the consortium was much more careful in offering recognition to any new splinter groups. In **Somalia** from 1991 through much of 1993, factions jostled to "capture" aid agency assets and employment, with some degree of success. The war in that country up until mid-1991 was largely over resource control: camels, technicals, food production, fertile land, etc. During the protracted war from late 1991 to the end of 1992, aid was the predominant liquid asset, and a major resource in the country for anyone who controlled it. "Targeting of food aid by armed looters was largely devoid of any political motivation," says an agency veteran. "The resources surrounding the humanitarian aid effort became the prime target."*

2.2.2 Undermining or weakening local capacities

Emergency relief can undermine the development of local people to cope with crises through traditional authority and social structures. "We constantly miss opportunities to strengthen traditional structures or support the building of new, better ones," said a regional food security advisor. Women are often overlooked as primary providers for the household, although programming has dramatically improved in its gender sensitivity in the past half decade.

Agencies can undermine indigenous social structures and fledgling local authorities in zones of crisis by the setting up of parallel administrations. These become artificial "economic islands" in seas of little opportunity, employing the best local talent in a set of priorities modeled after Western social welfare structures.

Example: *In Liberia interim government officials expressed concern about the "creeping control" of external aid agencies over vital institutions and services of the country. This trend, they said, would only replace the "weak, dependent state with indirect control through foreign-based institutions," which could be remedied through greater use of local NGOs.*

Inappropriately planned relief strategies can weaken local resilience and subsistence economies. Indigenous authorities and women usually have more of a stake than military authorities in preserving productive assets and livelihoods in the context of traditional community organization. If food aid is delivered, when animal health services or fishing gear might provide a viable means of survival, it not only risks attracting military diversion, but misses an opportunity to support the subsistence economy and indigenous social structure. "We are not investing in local 'buffer capacity,'" said an agency advisor. "We're double dipping: we come in to respond to this emergency but we reduce a country's ability to withstand a crisis the next time. We contribute to weakening local capacity. Institutional memory goes with the expatriate staff."

When aid agencies encourage the formation of refugee or internally displaced camps for logistical or other reasons, it is important to note that these camps often can have a deleterious effect on traditional values and structures.

Example: *In the major displaced camps in southern **Sudan**, "The sense of community has completely broken down," said one agency official. "Relief agencies are perpetuating this breakdown by not being creative." The emphasis should be more on distribution methods and partnerships which encourage the continuation of communities.*

While weakening local capacities, humanitarian aid risks legitimizing and thus strengthening warring factions. They may claim credit for the provision of relief, mobilize

populations on the basis of promised aid, organize and/or control local distribution structures, and favor supporters over opponents. Warleaders usually seek to keep populations as dependent and politically compliant as possible. Political authorities' use of external aid to mobilize local populations increases both their legitimacy and populations' expectations of future aid.

Examples: *The current effort by the* ***Sudan*** *government to bring OLS more tightly under its control is linked to its "peace from within" strategy. Linking the provision of aid, civil works, patronage, and other benefits of humanitarian assistance is an integral part of the government's pacification campaign, and if even partially successful could have a major impact on the course of the war. In 1991, aid and recognition by OLS for a splinter faction of the SPLA, the SSIA, helped that faction to survive for longer than it would have survived under its own power.*

2.2.3 Replacing Local Public Welfare Responsibilities

An increasing concern is "fungibility," the substitution of international aid for local public welfare responsibilities. This frees resources for combat and often leads local people to shift from productive activity to pursuing aid, making them more dependent and politically compliant.

Example: *The conflict in* ***former Yugoslavia*** *provided some of the earliest concerns about emergency aid freeing protagonists to prolong the conflict. Inconclusive evidence suggested aid both supported troops and released them from responsibilities to civilians.*[31] *In* ***Angola,*** *one NGO country director acknowledged, "We give aid to the people, and this allows warring parties to spend money on guns."*

Without appropriate engagement, humanitarian aid can undermine or even replace the public welfare mandates of local authorities, enabling them to pursue their war agendas unfettered by welfare responsibilities. "We're releasing authorities from their social contract," said a donor official. Not demanding accountability from local counterparts (in the context of agreements on mutual accountability and responsibility) can have damaging effects on these local welfare mandates.

Examples: *"The clearest examples are in* ***Mozambique, Angola*** *and* ***Liberia,"*** *commented a senior OFDA official. "Both warring parties have no regard for the humanitarian situation," says an NGO director in Angola, "[public welfare issues] are totally divorced from political considerations." In southern* ***Sudan,*** *"Some agencies have simply allowed certain percentages of their aid to be turned over to the military," commented one agency head. This reinforces the worst tendencies of predatory authorities, freeing them from any semblance of reciprocity with local populations. The more independent their supply lines are for their sustenance, the less interested authorities have to be in earning the trust and support of local populations. In* ***Rwanda*** *when the RPF launched its offensive in April 1994, a number of agencies followed them, assuming their social welfare responsibilities. "NGOs would go in front of each other to gain kudos from the RPF," said one agency official. "This completely undermined the RPF's sense of responsibility." In* ***Somaliland,*** *"the ministries have no resources, so their tactic is to switch the responsibility to the agencies," observed an NGO country director.*

3. PRINCIPLES, CODES AND CONFLICT

Various statements of humanitarian principles and codes of conduct have emerged in recent years.[32] This section summarizes some of the recurring and major themes such as accountability, neutrality and impartiality which are relevant to minimizing conflict. It then considers the limitations of applying such principles in practice.

3.1 The Holistic Approach

In order to pursue relief strategies which minimize the sustenance of conflict, there are a number of humanitarian principles and operational initiatives on offer. The first is built around a consensus that aid operations should see the "whole picture." The overall framework for humanitarian aid which increases flexibility and is more relevant to complex emergencies requires aid not just geared to directly meeting all possible basic needs (which is clearly beyond external capacity). Rather, the focus should be on helping communities adapt to chronic crisis and manage change through the restoration or protection of subsistence and through the building and supporting of indigenous capacity and community structures. "The survival economy must be supported," said an NGO official. "Aid should help restore a survival system and expand survival capacity as soon as possible. The agencies should help continue what the community itself starts and owns." Such an approach places critical importance on non-food assistance: primary health care, veterinary aid and agricultural inputs such as seeds and tools.

In trying to minimize aid's role in sustaining conflict or in building structures for peace, an individual project focus is inadequate. This critique is analogous to the women-in-development debate: WID projects can be marginally positive at the local level but often fail to address structural issues. Similarly, the context of humanitarian aid provision -- including methods of access -- must be examined. "We need to be very attentive in the deployment of our resources," says the country director of one agency. "We often don't look at distribution modalities and who they empower. In some places, avoiding trouble should be a major priority."

Although it is difficult for agencies to argue against the individual health clinic, hospital, or well project, such emergency aid may only provide an uncoordinated and inadequate social welfare bandaid. With limited resources subject to a global trend in governmental spending cuts, humanitarian assistance needs to be provided more strategically to address causes of conflict: strengthening civil structures, supporting the subsistence economy and trade, and reconciling local communities.

As one UN aid official commented: "One of the big problems with OFDA is their very restricted perception of what an emergency is. Many of the complex emergencies demand responses which are not classic relief responses (capacity building, education) and therefore fall outside of OFDA's mandate. Donors must rethink their definitions of relief and development." OFDA's legislated mandate clearly places it at odds with holistic reform of aid objectives and methods.

3.2 Maintaining Neutrality

Neutrality, as a Holy Grail of humanitarian operations, has inspired a search both for its meaning and practical realization. The neutralist position has been neatly summarized as "the provision of humanitarian assistance made on the basis of need alone, above and beyond any political, military, strategic or sectarian agenda."[33] The International Red Cross and Red Crescent

Movement breaks this proposition down into two concepts: neutrality means not taking sides, while impartiality directs aid according to need. However, the inevitable complications which attend traditional aid in complex emergencies -- capture by factions, subversion by militia, legitimization of unsavory leaders, and fueling of competition --are summarized in the adage, "You may not take an interest in politics, but politics will always take an interest in you."[34]

In their study Macrae and Zwi point out the ambiguities and dangers in the currently widespread humanitarian agency concept of "active neutrality," or giving both sides equal access to relief aid to enhance operational security, mitigate resource conflicts, and equally aid all civilians. Providing aid through indigenous relief agencies in rebel areas necessarily serves to politically legitimize their associated rebel organizations. They are thus able to feed the populations they seek to control. The same is true of government ministries and the agencies they mandate to distribute relief. More directly, such aid may sustain fighting forces and influence the dynamics of conflicts and the terms of settlements, just as lack of access to aid may force rebels to accept harsher peace terms. Moreover, organizations which attempt to give aid neutrally may support forces who harm the interest of and promote violence against civilian populations, such as RENAMO in Mozambique. However, as an agency's alternative may well be to subject civilian populations to the double punishment of violence and hunger, it is clear that they must make such determinations case by case, not via some abstract principle of "neutrality."[35]

Most operational agencies claim to be neutral intervenors, but increasingly acknowledge the inappropriateness or incompleteness of that concept. "No one regards NGOs as neutral any more," says Andrew Natsios of World Vision International. "If you respond to need, you're helping the side that suffers more."[36] In many complex emergencies marked by situations of divided governance, agencies find themselves painted as taking sides based on the geographical area or distribution modality they initially choose.

An analysis of humanitarian intervention for an NGO consortium concluded,

> "The evidence ... shows that Western states and the UN still respond to complex emergencies by developing "neutral" institutions of humanitarian intervention which are then protected, if necessary, by military force. Enforcement is a difficult and vexed question; what we can insist on is that this change of emphasis has highlighted the political and structural nature of contemporary emergencies. "Neutral" intervention avoids engagement with the political reality it confronts. It eschews the need for supporting participatory and accountable structures and institutions, and arguably makes matters worse."[37]

Neutrality, then, struggles to be an objective principle. What and who is "neutral" depends upon individual perceptions. To avoid unfair allegations of partiality, agencies should be straightforward in their public statements. Transparency, openness of operations to public view, is key. Moreover, humanitarian agencies need to reaffirm that responding proportionally to need does not represent taking sides . Rather, it represents the right of agencies to independently assess humanitarian needs and respond commensurate to those needs, not in response to the inevitable political pressure to service particular areas disproportionately.

Sometimes the local dynamics are shifting so quickly that agencies are unable to access sufficiently reliable information. In cases like this (where war has not created a major humanitarian emergency), it may be best to do nothing but closely monitor the situation.

Example: *The resumption of civil war in Somaliland in late 1994 at times left many agencies uncertain about the reality on the ground in many areas. "Many agencies are not responding*

because of a fear of being accused of not being neutral," observes the country director of one NGO.

3.3 Building Internal Accountability

Internal accountability of emergency aid depends upon the creation of a humanitarian lobby within the recipient society. This would strengthen internal demands for improved behavior by all parties in the aid relationship. External conditions requiring accountability can reinforce such internal demands. Accountability is not just a matter of responsibly managing resources, but also articulating and applying principles. Typical are the findings of Macrae and Zwi who admonish aid organizations to increase their accountability by including beneficiaries in planning, to more accurately analyze local politics and assess local organizations' capacities and limits, and to support indigenous humanitarian agencies where they can both deliver relief and help rebuild shattered societies.[38]

Operationally, transparency is critical for building internal accountability. Announcing aid rations both publicly at the time of distribution and in advance through community structures provides a check on unimpeded diversions by rapacious authorities -- whether military, commercial or civil. This social pressure is critical, and likely much more important than outsiders' demands. As an OFDA field staffer put it, "Society itself is the most important policing mechanism."

Examples: *In the Ngara refugee camp in* ***Tanzania,*** *ICRC personnel got megaphones, gathered the masses before distributions, and explained exactly what people were entitled to and the process. An observer of the process described it this way: "First they made people understand what they deserved. Then they went to the' responsibles' and told them what they should do. That way the people couldn't come back and say that they were cheated."*

In southern ***Sudan,*** *the rationale for the establishment of relief committees by local churches and later by WFP was that ultimately local communities play the most important role in making the SPLA accountable regarding aid distributions. Individual NGOs have concluded this as well. World Vision, for example, distributes its aid based on the decisions made at a public meeting between the chiefs, sub-chiefs, and gol leaders. "The SPLA will inevitably get fed. They are part of the community. Accountability must be demanded by the people," says an observer.*

3.4 Operating Principles: International Codes of Conduct

Numerous attempts have been made to establish a basic set of principles which might guide humanitarian action. Best known is the professional Code of Conduct established by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and a number of NGOs .[39] Although many of the major humanitarian organizations have signed up, the diversity among relief organizations suggests that developing individual codes of conduct for similar groups might be more practical than attempting to devise an all-purpose code.[40]

"A code of conduct would be extremely positive as a generally accepted tool or guideline for operations if it has unanimous support," says the regional director of an international agency. "It should be kept very simple, and should be used as a guide and a way of harmonizing the activities of all actors." A Rwandan aid official concurred: "The best enforcement mechanism for a code of conduct is example."

In the attempt to reduce diversion, both a firm commitment to basic principles and wide dissemination of these principles are needed. To the maximum extent possible, the principles should be mutually agreed among aid providers and various recipient constituencies, both military and civil. "Ground rules are a tool for communication," says the country director of a European NGO. "Ground rules are critical," concurs a field-based relief official. "Some kind of contract is needed. Many people in relief are not professionals, yet they are the front-line diplomats."

In some contexts, a unique code may be required, but there is often a lack of respect for existing international legal principles. "We can't go in at the outset of every emergency and renegotiate new terms of reference," cautions an aid official. Adhering to existing or negotiated codes can be used as a yardstick for the acceptance of the legitimacy of an authority internationally. This positive form of conditionality can provide a lever for behavioral change on the part of abusive and predatory authorities. There is also much room to do principle-building before a crisis erupts, rather than waiting for the eruption and then introducing codes, ground rules, or conventions.

If agencies are publicly to address the issue of diversion and abuse, all must do so openly, collectively, and through detailed, public chronicling of incidents, rather than glossing over major diversions and providing further relief to replace looted property.[41] Sudanese local churches have shown that urging warring parties to honor humanitarian principles and alerting them to the consequences in publicity of their failures to do so can go hand in hand.[42]

There is growing discussion about the need to be able to stop aid in response to the abuse of humanitarian principles. But suspension of relief may be more logical in the context of a framework of agreement between parties about minimal operating conditions. And there has to be a clear distinction drawn between shutting down and pulling out. The former allows more flexibility in negotiation as well as keeping the option open of maintaining a witnessing function. The latter represents an option of last resort, only invoked when the calculation is made that the aid and presence do more harm than good.

3.5 Limits to Codification: Principles in Action

How well do humanitarian principles guide operations? "The big question is how to make those rules or principles stick in practice," comments a UN official, "we are still a long way from knowing it ourselves, [though] dissemination is key." Since their inception the ICRC has disseminated the Geneva Conventions to warring parties and abusive authorities. In regions of eastern Ethiopia -- plagued by low-intensity conflict between the government and different rebel militia -- observers on the ground have pointed out that ICRC's quiet dissemination has had a positive effect on the behavior of soldiers. Such dissemination requires persistence and considerable staff time.

One danger of such codes is their vulnerability to political manipulation. Codes (and resulting sanctions) can be invoked for subjective reasons, and would create continuous dilemmas and interruptions in resource-scarce, volatile regions marked by divided authority and mixed front lines. Transparent procedures for utilizing the codes would be a critical prerequisite for their deployment in a conflict situation.

A second difficulty is the method of including a rebel movement in ground rule signing and/or dissemination. "You'll have major problems with governments," says an agency representative. "Why put yourself inside a political arena when you're trying to remain neutral?" More broadly, many program managers in the field expressed skepticism about the acceptability

to governments of codes of conduct, confining their relevance to situations of disputed, divided or unclear authority.

A third problem with codes and ground rules is that they often ignore traditional legal principles inherent in a war-effected society. Additional efforts must be undertaken to make international principles relevant in the context of what are often richly developed indigenous principles of group interaction.

A fourth obstacle is the difficulty inherent in coordinating all (or even some) of the agencies responding to an emergency in their implementation of any particular code. "There are always external influences which might override in-country agreement," said the country director of an agency in Rwanda This was a major problem there, where 150 NGOs descended on the post-genocide emergency with remarkable differences in professional standards. "Without some basic code, what is an NGO?" asks ...., the country director of an established NGO in Kigali. "We are losing our special status."

4. MINIMIZING CONFLICT: TEN POLICY IMPERATIVES

Although aid can sustain conflict -- or a party to a conflict -- as a function of policy, this paper focuses on the inadvertent contribution of relief to conflict. To minimize fueling the fire, there is a consensus that operational approaches need to be re-evaluated and reoriented. This section identifies ten aspects of humanitarian aid operations where the potential for conflict-sustaining side effects can be minimized: planning and information, assessment, access modalities, types of aid, targeting and distribution, cost-standardization, monitoring and evaluation, engagement and capacity building, human rights monitoring, and coordination.

Some of the imperatives are negatives: "dont do x." Others are comparatives: "do y rather than x". Others yet are innovations: "do z." Certain themes recur in the different imperatives. For OFDA the process of drafting country strategies provides the ideal opportunity to apply these standards.

4.1 Planning and Information Sources

4.1.1 Take the broad view

Narrow or short-sighted planning at the outset of an emergency response can dictate to a great degree the extent to which negative impacts result from that response. Questions about the effect of conflict on aid operations and the effect of aid operations on the conflict need to be dealt with at the planning stage. Relief planners must broaden the scope of their attention, argue Keen and Wilson in one study, from how operations reach at-risk persons to how they impact the economic and/or military strategies of all parties. Attention should be given to those who suffer directly or indirectly, and those that can alleviate, benefit from, and help to create famine and displacement. Planners must think in terms not just of commodities but winners and losers.[43]

Example: *In the **Rwandan** refugee camps, "Humanitarian need was the imperative, but thinking strategically about repatriation from the beginning was lacking," charges a donor representative. "There was never pressure from the UN system to plan in terms of a regional response." A policy analyst characterized the information disconnect between NGOs operating in the refugee camps and the NGOs inside Rwanda the "Iron Curtain."*

4.1.2 Consider timing

Planning for appropriate timing of a response can be key. Providing food aid during harvest time, a constant of nearly every emergency response, results in less interest in the aid on the part of the local community and thus an easier target for diversion by warring parties. Timing in the provision of inputs besides food is obviously critical as well.

Example: *In **Rwanda** in 1995, FAO called for a meeting on seed distribution roughly one month before the rains were to begin. This lack of planning indirectly hinders broader objectives of facilitating repatriation, a prerequisite for any reconciliation process. How can refugees be confident to return if the assistance infrastructure is not in place?*

4.1.3 Use guidelines

One way to encourage better agency planning is to build more extensive guidelines and requirements into Requests for Proposals (RFPs). There is a wide disparity between what different donors require in proposals they solicit (as well as a wide variation in quality of planning among the agencies). Demonstrating that agencies do indeed have a short- and medium-term plan of action should be a minimal requirement of funding, to maximize sustainability and operational integrity. Mechanisms should be explored to exclude those that don't meet minimal guidelines. "You need to create rigorous requirements that force agencies to plan," suggests the country director of one NGO. Another donor official concurs: "There are a core of NGOs and UN agencies which are very good, and lots that are rubbish. Donors need to be more responsible in asking questions."

4.1.4 Identify skilled personnel as a contingency

Part of the planning nexus is having the appropriate personnel available. Aid workers frequently cite the one variable which distinguishes politically adroit operations from business-as-usual is the quality of personnel. "We need a `first team' of sophisticated operators to deal with the Rwandas and Somalias when they erupt," says another donor official. In the context of slow-onset emergencies, by waiting for the eruption agencies lose opportunities to build in experience and information, critical in minimizing the negative externalities of aid.

Example: *UNICEF has moved in this direction by creating a global Rapid Response Team, and NGOs like CARE are looking at how to pre-position experienced personnel and key staff in situations deemed likely to explode. CARE currently is developing a contingency plan for the Greater Horn with an investment of about $2 million. It will be a test case for this kind of NGO planning.*

4.1.5 Plan well in advance

Advanced planning is the essence of crisis prevention. The earlier and better prepared the response, the earlier rehabilitative principles can be introduced into the aid package, and the sooner issues minimizing aid's sustenance of conflict can be addressed. Donor countries need to have updated plans of action for areas which threaten to erupt. "Both the State [Department] and USAID Inspector Generals consistently remark on the lack of mission preparation with specific reference to Mission Disaster Relief Plans and Emergency Action Plans," decried a cable addressing U.S. disaster assistance.

Example: *"We need to do dress rehearsals and simulations to deal with diversion and violence," said one OFDA official, who added, "DART training in Somalia didn't deal with political issues*

or negotiating with faction leaders. OFDA field staff never saw any clan trees, or had any basic political or social briefings" in advance of their arrival.

4.1.6 Involve local people

Planning for relevant community participation is a major determinant in building internal community accountability. The chain of inconsistent accountability referred to in Sections 2 and 3 begins with poor planning, and war economies are often reinforced as a result. The dis-empowerment that low-intensity military tactics impose on many groups, like women, makes it vital to ensure broad local participation in, and re-empowerment through, rehabilitation planning.[44]

Planning should also strive to minimize dislocations of populations. As Section 2 has shown, a displaced population and the aid it receives are more vulnerable to manipulation by military leaders than resident populations.

Example: *OFDA's DART team in* ***Northern Iraq*** *was key in developing the plan to resettle displaced Kurds back in their home areas, rather than in the mountain camps in which the U.S. military was prepared to continue a major operation to shelter and feed them.*

4.1.7 Generate and circulate quality information

All agencies need guidance regarding the local context in which they operate. Quality, timing and availability of information are critical in this respect. There is often little understanding of aid's impact on conflict or its potential for reconciliation. In some cases, this can be rectified by making already-produced/published information available to agency staff. Analysis of the military situation needs to be made available to agency personnel, both policy-makers and implementors. Key literature on sectoral or programming priorities would also be useful, such as information on capacity building techniques and results. Efforts should be made to preserve institutional memory by making situation reports accessible to present as well as future staff, and to share these reports to the maximum extent possible between agencies.

The quality of information is as much an issue as availability. Agency reports are usually the primary source of information for policy-makers and donors in chronic conflict areas. What the information is being used for -- fundraising, resource deployment, public education -- has a bearing on what information is presented, and how it is presented. Agency information may concentrate on humanitarian successes with little context and few alternative sources of information. Furthermore, little thought is given to how to "disseminate information that will assist the victims and impede those who exacerbate or profit from disaster."[45]

Information may be insufficient or inadequate especially where the situation is quickly changing. In that event, it may be advisable for an agency or a consortium of agencies to hire a country expert on a short-term basis who is aware of inter-communal dynamics and political and economic realities, and who can advise agencies on hiring practices and aid activities which might minimize the contribution of these actions to the escalating of conflict. "In the early stages, someone with cultural insights would be just invaluable," asserted an OFDA field contractor. "This tends to be the weak link in our response, and a clash of values often results." Another OFDA field staffer concurred, suggesting that OFDA should place someone with local knowledge on the DART teams, "someone to provide insights into the sociology of culture."

Examples: *Many agencies responding to the mass exodus of* ***Rwandans*** *in Zaire and Tanzania were not fully aware of the political structures that were quickly being reconstituted in the camps. Similarly, the intervention of UNITAF in* ***Somalia*** *was based on mis-analysis of information about the causes of mortality and morbidity. The agencies which preceded UNITAF had greatly differing levels of understanding of the local dynamics. "Most problems where emergencies become chronic and agencies are unable to disengage usually stem from misinterpretations in the first place," says the regional director of an NGO.*

4.1.8 Build-in early monitoring and evaluation

The operations director of a U.S. NGO expressed this need: "Within three months, someone needs to come in at the management level and ask basic implementation questions. A common set of questions ought to be developed for all agencies."

Example: *The newly-created UNICEF Rapid Response Team is discussing the feasibility of within one month of the onset of an emergency operation bringing in an internal auditor to evaluate and advise the agency on how to avoid major mistakes.*

4.2 Assessment of Needs

4.2.1 Get accurate numbers

Humanitarian aid is more easily diverted when population figures are inflated, a function of poor or inadequate assessment. Equally, violent competition may result when agencies under-estimate. The proper collection of data is critical, especially in situations of mass concentrations of refugees or internally displaced people. Insufficient or simplistic assessments -- especially those that don't properly factor the effect of conflict on local economies -- are another weak link in the chain of inconsistent accountability.

Example: *Obtaining accurate numbers in the* ***Liberia*** *emergency, even the population at the outset of the crisis, has been difficult and problematic. Aid agencies undoubtedly struggled with figures inflated by factions for political and economic gain.*

4.2.2 Get details on local economies and markets

Aid can also feed conflict where assessments routinely fail to uncover the entire food economy, especially the unofficial markets that are created by stolen commodities. These economic channels need to be understood: where do the commodities go? Who sells them? Who gets the money? Who else benefits? Agencies must work out the hidden links. "In order to do this, we need to refrain from humanitarian thinking," says one agency veteran.

Decisions agencies make about the deployment and utilization of resources can have profound impacts on local economies and local power structures. Ignorance of these structures -- even when resulting from a misguided sense of do-good neutrality -- is dangerous. Assessment models which don't uncover these economic circles are inadequate for war situations.

Average or general pictures are meaningless in emergencies: broad nutritional surveys, if possible, would be uninformative and mask or hide the localized crises that comprise emergencies. Some analysts thus support "sentinel site" monitoring of a few selected communities--

complemented by rapid assessment capacity--as saving personnel, costs, and time and facilitating rapport with localities and subtle analysis and differentiation of groups.[46]

Example: *Save the Children (UK) has pioneered methods of assessing local market trends in* ***Mali*** *through its SADS (Suivi Alimentaire Delta-Seno). While labor intensive and hard to sustain especially in conflicts, the project aspires to the level of local knowledge required for "aid with integrity".*

4.2.3 Define vulnerability

Assessments should address *why* people are vulnerable. What are the multiple factors which cause a food system to break down, or a rapid deterioration of the health of people in a community? Needs assessments must address the globality of human needs, problems and capacities. Understanding to whom agencies are responding is also critical. "Agencies need to understand sociological habits," says one regional food security expert. "We need to differentiate age and sex. Demographics need to be quantified early on and tailored to."

Example: *OLS in southern* ***Sudan*** *has introduced a food economy assessment model, with the help of Save the Children-UK. OLS has experimented with its assessment techniques, striving to combine quantitative and qualitative data. While 1992/93 assessments focused on quantitative, household-level data, set against wider socioeconomic and military issues, the 1994 assessments introduced the food economy approach, derived from SCF-UK work on risk-mapping in food crises. This approach measures and ranks the degree of potential food deficit in caloric terms among different population subgroups, allowing agencies to target the acutely vulnerable. Researchers ask key informants to estimate the foods available to the "average household" in the population and then calculate and pie-chart the percentage shortfall in households' energy needs. The focus on available-food-converted-into-energy derives from classic household food consumption study techniques; by using key informants rather than household surveys, researchers can extend this costly approach to emergency needs assessment.*[47] *"With the food economy model, we have a rationalization of why we do or do not help in a given situation," says one UN field operator. "We have a mandate." Added a UN field officer, "The food economy model has reduced overt diversion in southern Sudan simply by making it harder to divert."*

It should be noted there are critiques of the food economy approach to emergency need assessment as overly-economistic, presenting famine victims as passive and excluding consideration of violence. The food economy approach, moreover, by focusing on "average" households, can overlook disparities and power relations among households, and by aiming to quantify famine outcomes, de-emphasizes analysis of dynamics and causation. De Waal stresses the importance of coping strategies as famines unfold; choices to accept short-term hunger to avoid the long-term, irreversible sale of productive assets are crucial, and many groups begin under-consuming food early in famine. The food economy approach may not accommodate hunger as a strategic choice, or food production strategies that seek not to maximize output but minimize risks or labor use. Outsiders may thus over-prioritize food needs, even in chronic situations, and not respond to local priorities on asset preservation.[48]

In ***Somalia*** *in 1995 OFDA was trying to determine local coping mechanisms. "We didn't understand this until recently," commented one donor official at the time. "We didn't do much assistance in the livestock sector because we didn't know where the herds were or how many animals were around. There was no baseline we could use. Maybe with better information early on we could have determined the appropriate inputs. Food security is not just food." On reflection, a senior OFDA official added "Nor is it our issue."*

4.2.4 Avoid bias

To whom agencies talk on assessments can also dictate inappropriate responses. In insecure areas, travel is by day and is often escorted by local authorities. Assessment researchers should strive to speak to representatives not only of dominant groups in each area, but also of smaller, disenfranchised social groups. Gender bias is strongly toward men unless challenged. And the escorts themselves obviously affect the veracity of the data, as illustrated in Section 2. Consequently, independence of assessment is perhaps one of the most important policy imperatives which must be insisted upon in conflict contexts. While local groups obviously can lobby for resources, agencies must accommodate such pressures within a strong, carefully planned framework of independent data collection and assessment.[49]

4.2.5 Act on the data

Agencies have to be open to the data which empirical assessments produce. It should be shared and acted upon.

Examples: *In **Somaliland**, some agencies found that the majority of civilians displaced by the resumption of conflict in 1994 were able to fend for themselves, and a major relief effort might add additional fuel to the civil war's fire. Doing nothing but active monitoring and capacity-building may be the most helpful response in some situations. In **Goma**, OFDA field staff in the camps concluded that OFDA aid was helping to strengthen the authority of former government officials who control the camps. Assessed as doing more harm than good, OFDA decided to stop its aid to those camps.*

4.2.6 Beware over-complexity and developmentalism.

More complex assessment models do have obvious drawbacks, including a shortage of trained personnel able to carry out exercises like participatory rural assessments (PRA). Front-line UN agency personnel -- Resident Project Officers, food monitors, sectoral experts -- are often unfamiliar with PRA. Where it exists, training is usually inadequate. There is often a lack of cooperation between agricultural and animal health experts in calibrating the response to agro-pastoral and pastoral communities in crisis. And assessment models often are insufficiently placed into a war context, inadequately factoring in the stresses and responses which chronic conflict produces. "Training of agency personnel in assessment techniques should be a condition of OFDA funding," says one NGO representative.

As aid programs expand to include developmentalist goals, they modify their assessment vocabulary to include "the rhetoric of participation," while the reality of participation is both limited and, in wartime, problematic. External agencies cannot avoid the necessity of developing the fullest knowledge, from continuous presence, of local social structures, power relations, representatives' legitimacy, and disenfranchised groups to ensure that participation in assessment does not allow the powerful to self-aggrandize.[50]

With declining resources and growing impatience with diverted or misused aid, it is clear that agencies cannot respond to all assessed "needs", which may be infinite. Responses will -- and should -- rely more on local capacities to address chronic crises. "Needs assessments should be asking what a community is doing or has done, and what its current constraints are," says a UN consultant. "When you follow that line of questioning, you find the gaps that can be filled."

4.3 Negotiating and Ensuring Access

The various methods of negotiating and ensuring access for emergency aid can play a determining role in minimizing aid's contribution to the sustenance of conflict. Access can be negotiated through humanitarian diplomacy, achieved through cross-border operations in defiance of sovereignty, or it can be ensured through military or commercial means. It can go by road, rail, barge, air, or even donkey path. The social and economic consequences of these different distribution methods may be overlooked. The essential question is: who do they empower? This section addresses the transportation of assistance from the point of origin to the town or village level; the transfer of commodities from that point to the end recipients will be covered in section 4.5 on targeting and distribution methods.

In many ways the Horn of Africa has provided ground-breaking experience. The cross-border operation into Eritrea and Ethiopia had little precedent. The corridors of tranquility agreed to in Sudan presaged a whole new approach to humanitarian action in which the UN negotiates access and NGOs implement in the context of elaborate access agreements. Military interventions, first in northern Iraq and then in Somalia, now a high-water mark in such action, for a short time came closest to an international principle of the enforceable right to humanitarian aid. Subsequent policy changes in Washington, notably restrictions on peacekeeping, coinciding with greater timidity over crises in Rwanda and Burundi, has refocused the debate on negotiated access.

4.3.1 Negotiate Access

Negotiating access to aid people as close to their home areas as possible is an important factor in maintaining community structures critical in providing alternatives to militarized authority. Negotiating the return of displaced populations to their home areas should be a priority in all negotiated access frameworks.

Examples: *OFDA has played an important role in negotiating access to war-affected populations during the last half decade. OFDA Directors were key in negotiations leading to the creation of OLS, the opening of Massawa port in Eritrea in 1990, the moving of commodities into war-torn Angola also in 1990, and the attempt to open and maintain access to Somalia's affected populations.*[51]

The response to the long term crisis in southern Sudan provides a model of negotiated access, the modality of choice of most agencies and donors. Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) is the first case in which warring factions have agreed over a long period of time to allow humanitarian supplies to cross lines of battle. For over six years, OLS has provided a channel for NGO and UN assistance to war-affected populations. As in Eritrea and Ethiopia, military intervention was not part of the response. Crucial to OLS' success has been the willingness of the warring parties and the universal sharing of benefits.

4.3.2 Use Military Protection with Care, Military Coercion Beware

Increased external military involvement in complex emergencies both as a protector and provider of humanitarian aid has been a mixed blessing for established aid agencies. While many praise increasing military involvement in humanitarian relief as a positive, rights-protective step, others fear a new pattern of relief-assistance-as-political-crisis-management. The tremendous costs of military operations are disproportionate to the value of the emergency aid protected. They also raise fears that geopolitics and public relations considerations rather than human need will increasingly drive aid decisions as they merge with wider foreign policy objectives. Military interventions can complicate the dynamics of conflict and lead to combatants targeting aid

workers. Moreover, military peacekeeping itself can be corrupted and swing from protecting to violating human rights.[52] Although a detailed analysis of the military contribution is beyond the scope of this paper, any consideration of access issues now must include this new player. Accurate or not, OFDA's perceived proximity to US military initiatives inevitably demands a sensitivity to the reactions of local protagonists.

Example: *Military humanitarianism, though too late to deal with the worst of the death toll, was a central feature of the international response to the humanitarian crisis in* ***Somalia.*** *Operation Restore Hope in December 1992 represents the first case in which UN forces were committed without the consent of a standing government, although the lack of such in Somalia at the time of the intervention made the issue somewhat academic. The limited humanitarian mandate at the outset of the intervention was eclipsed by a number of broader policy goals and political decisions which went far beyond the original intent of the operation, and ultimately brought about its demise. It was the obsession with security and protecting commodities which drove the response at the end of 1992, rather than the search for strategies that would avoid direct distributions by agencies which were so vulnerable to diversion and extortion.*

A study conducted by Refugee Policy Group concludes that the military intervention saved between 10,000 and 25,000 lives, far less than figures cited by U.S. and UN policy-makers and spokespersons.[53] *"$4 billion could have gone a long way to strengthening buffers of local communities," observes one food security expert. "The women and the weather helped more than the troops."*

Example: *In an unprecedented move that signalled the desperation which officials had reached, two battalions of Zairian troops were hired by UNHCR to maintain security in the* ***Rwandan*** *camps in Zaire after the UN Secretary General failed to recruit an international police force. The UNHCR paid the Zairian Government to deploy the soldiers under joint Zairian/international control to maintain law and order, prevent intimidation of and escort returnees, and guarantee UN and NGO security. An international civilian Liaison Group helps monitor Zairian troops deployed in Rwandan refugee camps; mediates between the Zairian force, the UNHCR and NGOs, and refugee leader; and investigates security breaches and soldiers' abuses or undiscipline.*

This force has succeeded in a limited role but has no mandate to arrest suspected genocide participants, stop arms flows and militarization, or halt border incursions from Rwanda by militia. "It worked out far beyond expectations," says one veteran official. "The troops had a major positive effect on the camps; law and order have improved." Fairly unorthodox methods were employed to a semblance of that law and order: people who led demonstrations were arrested, and often jailed and beaten by the soldiers. "This has lessened the authority of some of the leaders in the eyes of the people," claims one official. Nevertheless, the troops did not address separating the bulk of the civilian population from the militia nor have they arrested those accused of crimes against humanity.

Example: *The intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the* ***Liberia*** *crisis illustrated the dangers of a regional military initiative. The Nigerian-dominated force found itself in conflict with the largest rebel force, the NPFL. Aid agencies using the ECOWAS force (ECOMOG) as a shield for humanitarian operations were perceived as taking sides by association. Difficulties of access were later compounded by a ban on cross-border aid. This ban was supported by the UN and enforced by ECOMOG.*

4.3.3 Use commercial channels with commercial acumen

Of course, no method is a panacea. While using commercial channels may reduce the number of armed men employed by agencies for security as well as reducing diversion, it can empower merchants who are the financiers of particular warlords. Agencies must be very careful to understand and/or avoid cartels which try to manipulate markets and bring malnutrition levels up in order to increase the international response, and hence their profits. In some contexts, commercial channels offer little advantage.

Example: *The search for more secure and less militarized channels to bring commodities into Somalia has led agencies to increasingly utilize commercial channels. WFP has sold commodities to Somali merchants in Mombasa, contracted them to transport the goods to targeted sites, where WFP buys back the commodities. A variation on this theme of commercializing aid deliveries is to directly contract merchants (or private cooperatives) to buy commodities and transport them to their destination of distribution, allowing the merchants roughly a ten percent profit margin, payable upon receipt of goods at the end destination. "Instead of sixty percent being ripped off, we could have ten percent mark-ups," asserts a European donor official. "Merchants have all their own arrangements," says the country director of an aid agency. "The salient point is that the commodities belong to individuals." A prominent Somali merchant agrees: "If WFP comes, the militias will loot. If the bags say 'Gift of the USA,' they will be looted. But if the goods are in the possession of businessmen, they will be safe. Businessmen will pay for security and make deals to move." The security of the goods are ensured principally by the deterrence afforded by the certainty of clan retribution. For example, when a Habr Gedir militia looted a Rahanweyne (Leyson) businessman in Mogadishu in June 1995, the Leyson captured five Habr Gedir trucks, and held them until compensation was given. "The days of agencies controlling distributions are over," says a Somali employee of a UN agency. A regional director of an NGO agrees: "Greater reliance on market-based solutions and commercial channels will be more effective than messy direct distributions." Donors have considered various options for moving commodities about since UNOSOM's departure. "We've suggested using shopkeepers, mosques," says one donor official. "But these ideas are laughed at by most people. Instead, most everyone is looking at the old way of getting assurances from Aidid."*

Monetization is also utilized as a method of getting a diversified set of commodities into the market, as well as raising local currency for small-scale rehabilitation projects. However, it can be an inappropriate response when the purchasing power of affected populations has collapsed. Monetization also requires in-depth understanding of the commercial networks in a society, and a reasonable analysis of how monetized commodities will effect markets.

Example: *The limits of monetization in terms of inadequate purchasing power are seen in mid-1995 studies in Bay Region in* ***Somalia*** *conducted by AICF. The studies found that the global malnutrition rate for children 6-29 months of age was 25.7%, and only 16% of families had access to food on the market. The study concluded: "In view of the good sorghum harvests in the last two seasons, ... the precarious nutritional situation in the area could be partly due to the lack of variation in diets, cased by the population's lack of income and their inability to purchase other foodstuffs and sources of nutrition on the markets."*[54]

4.3.4 Diversify through Cross-Border Routes

The diversification of entry points for emergency supplies is also a strategy which might reduce the unintended empowering of a particular authority. Utilizing various cross-border channels and/or smaller ports (or even beach landings, as in the case of ICRC in Somalia in 1992) can lessen the dependence agencies have on particular large-scale extortion networks, but may create smaller ones. Diversification may also create geographic, logistic and economic difficulties.

Examples: *Despite recommendations early in the* ***Liberia*** *crisis for more cross-border aid to up-country areas, aid agencies flocked into Monrovia. Although it provided the only secured port and airstrip, the concentration of resources guaranteed further polarization of the conflict. Monrovia was reaffirmed as the chief prize in the conflict. Aid agencies based there were seen as partisan. Cross-line aid became dangerous. Cross-border aid was seen as feeding the enemy and subjected to bans and harassment. Greater diversification at the outset might have secured a more neutral and safer role for aid, and thereby reached a wider population.*[55]

In ***Sudan****, where the government periodically threatens to close down the southern sector of OLS and force commodities to go through government channels, contingency plans are debated by agencies who would refuse to succumb to that kind of control. An expansion of cross-border channels from Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Zaire, and C.A.R. would likely be the only alternative. The rationale for increased risk (Ugandan rebels) and cost (Zairian extortion) is to avoid further empowering the Sudanese government through all of the fringe benefits it accrues as outlined in Section 2 .*

Western responses to the famines of ***Eritrea*** *and northern* ***Ethiopia*** *in the mid-1980s represented the first stirring of an agenda of humanitarian intervention in North-South relations.*[56] *Both the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the two principal movements fighting the central government in Addis Ababa until their victories in 1991, developed the political practice of linking mass mobilization with the provision of public welfare. The humanitarian wings of the political movements, the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), were the conduits through which external aid passed, aid which primarily came from the Emergency Relief Desk consortium. These indigenous local organizations provide a model of efficiency and local capacity building for other complex political emergencies.*[57]

4.3.5 Think and act regionally

In situations of regional instability and interrelated conflict across borders, the response should be framed as regionally as possible. Staff from the same agencies can have totally different perceptions of common problems across borders. Quite often, the available principles and conventions are not applicable to these complex regional emergencies. For example, the status of refugees and internally displaced persons is a false dichotomy, especially in regions where borders divide identity groups.

Examples: *Some agencies have refused to engage in a conventional refugee program for populations which had moved from* ***Somaliland*** *to Region Five (the Somali Region of Ethiopia, popularly known as the Ogaden) Although normally these two categories of displaced are treated differently in terms of assistance and protection, as a UN consultant put it, "We looked at this population as if they were displaced on both sides of the border, so as to not draw people artificially out of their home country."*

The Greater Horn of Africa Initiative formulates a regional framework as its starting point. But agencies usually don't cross borders with ease. "International staff and refugees should move together," says one regional expert commenting on the refugees from ***Rwanda*** *and* ***Burundi****. "We must deal with the institutional barriers around the borders. We abandon communities, often with no resilience to future shocks."*

The root causes and solutions to the problems of refugees and internally displaced persons are often the same. In 1992, UNHCR and a handful of NGOs operating in the ***Somali*** *refugee camps in northeast Kenya went rapidly to a cross border operation to contain refugee flows and prevent refugee camps from becoming lighthouses for affected populations in both countries. Minimizing dislocation should be a primary objective of access frameworks. As discussed in Section 2, displaced populations are more easily manipulated by war-leaders, and subsistence economies which more directly support traditional and civilian leadership are undermined by dislocation.*

Also noted in Section 2 are the myriad examples of the location of relief operations helping to sustain conflict. In the ***Rwandan*** *camps in Zaire, the wild panic which operations were in during the first couple months after the genocide were not amenable to relocating recipient sites. Nevertheless, "soon after we could have moved aid back farther away from the border," says one UN official. "But wrong political analysis led people to think that the refugees would return very soon."*

Acting regionally can have difficult international legal implications especially when operating across borders. For example, issues like the pursuit of Aidid and the presence of genocide perpetrators in the Rwandan camps take on an extra dimension. Arrest orders are complicated by the lack of an enforcement body to implement international conventions or decisions consistently. Humanitarian organizations -- along with civilians in the impacted area -- are often the principal victims of such erratic enforcement, and are even blamed (only sometimes justifiably) for not dealing with the ties between civilian populations and war criminals, at times solidified by situations in which populations are concentrated for distribution of relief supplies.

Examples: *To separate the genocide organizers from the civilian populations in* ***Goma*** *would have required specialized military forces to isolate hundreds of people among hundreds of thousands of people who would inevitably have been terrorized into providing shelter and protection for the leaders. "It would have catalyzed a confrontation," said one observer. "The analysis was correct all along, but the means to address the problem were too difficult." The fruitless, violent hunt for Aidid undoubtedly played into calculations not to send a UN force into Rwandan camps. In November 1994, NGOs and UN camp managers in Goma publicly called for international peacekeeping forces to separate civilian populations from leaders. After months of inaction, the Zairian troops were finally contracted, a halfway measure that addressed the worst symptoms but left the root causes untouched.*

As indicated, a more regional approach to the ***Liberia*** *crisis using neighboring countries for cross-border aid might have secured a more comprehensive program. The "fortress Monrovia" policy did nothing to discourage the export of looting and conflict to neighboring Sierra Leone. Notwithstanding security and logistical considerations, more could have been done to equalize aid throughout the region.*

4.4 Types of Aid

There are two ways in which the type of aid may relate to the sustenance or reduction of conflict. First, certain kinds of inputs are more lootable than others, and draw the attention of those looking for resources for their cause. Second, some aid responds to symptoms only and can promote dependency, whereas other aid can be utilized to promote subsistence and support traditional community structures and efforts to protect livelihoods.

It should be noted much of what follows relates to food aid and its distribution. Although not technically part of its mandate, OFDA is heavily implicated in food matters. In 1995 up to 42% of its operational budget went to food related activities, certainly more than any other sector. Such funds often provide essential support for food operations and must give OFDA a critical say in their applicability. This is reinforced by its institutional proximity to the Food for Peace Office in BHR. A typical example is Liberia where the 1995 budget for Food for Peace was $51.6 million while that of OFDA was $7.3 million of which the largest grant was related to food.

Before addressing specific issues, two guiding principles are suggested.

4.4.1 Flexibility before food

Emergencies which require interventions in Africa are consistently misinterpreted as food emergencies. OFDA officials admitted it was easier to think of relief first in terms of food since the system and budget was geared up in that direction. But food shortfalls or inaccessibility are usually only a symptom of deeper, structural problems which food aid may exacerbate. Better assessment and analysis can lead to a more appropriate mix of inputs and policy responses, including much less food than most current interventions.

Flexibility is a key concept in providing agencies with the tools to reduce their contribution to conflict. Donor mandates must be more flexible to allow responses appropriate to local conditions unfettered by distinctions between relief and development. (Although donors have become more aware of the importance of prevention, resources are still harder to access for prevention than for cure.) And agencies must be flexible to respond to fast-changing conflict contexts.

4.4.2 Sustainability.

While sustainability may seem an alien concept for a disaster relief agency, the emphasis on exit strategies, transition and reconstruction suggests some attention should be paid even in emergency phases for what is to follow. National health and social welfare systems underwritten by large foreign aid programs are a thing of the past in many countries impacted by chronic conflict. Linear development models completely fail to capture current realities. Tax bases in conflict-affected countries are grossly inadequate, and development aid budgets are shrinking globally. The reproduction of western-style state-administered welfare programs is unsustainable: such programs cannot continue to function beyond the external input. What then are appropriate responses to basic needs? External response to these emergencies should be driven by what already works at the local level, structures that are already in place and supported by the community. "We must take our cue from the successes on the ground," says one UN consultant. Filling the holes in the social safety net is critical, but "for the rest, we should be working with the private sector and supporting their initiatives."

4.4.3 Using Non-Lootable Aid

Types of aid which less easily feed conflict are situation-specific, but in general a food's market value can play a major role in whether it draws the interest of military forces and looters. Moreover, the ease of converting direct food aid to cash makes it easier for militaries to exploit than agricultural rehabilitation programs.[58]

Example: *Internationally donated rice in* ***Somalia*** *reached legendary status in terms of its attractiveness to looters, whereas sorghum drew little interest. "Somalia starkly illustrates the perils of high value commodities," says an NGO official. CARE reported an experience in the Juba Valley in which one of its convoys was attacked by looters, but upon discovering that the contents were sorghum, the looters departed, leaving the trucks and their contents untouched. The strategy of BHR and some other agencies by mid-1992 was to flood the country with maize, bulgar wheat and sorghum instead of rice.[59] ICRC moved to cooked food in hundreds of kitchens in Somalia to reduce the interest of looters.*

In many cases, blended foods -- nutritionally high in value but less appealing to the taste -- should be considered. Blended foods would be appropriate as general rations, rather than only as emergency food for severely malnourished children. It is a misconception that blended foods -- powdered, vitamin-fortified blends of cereals, pulses, and possibly milk and sugar -- are too expensive for such use and there is less likelihood of its diversion for adult consumption.[60] Foods that can be stored for extended periods of time for communities which keep their supplies buried in grain stores to avoid preying militias should also be considered.

Example: *Southern Sudanese have expanded cassava production because it has proven useful in crises, as in Mozambique and Liberia: it resists insects and can be left in the ground for three years as a food reserve safe from looters.*[61]

When providing seeds, part of the equation for selection of particular varieties should include their value to looters, their storage capacity, their time of germination (fast-yielding varieties in situations of chronic insecurity are often favored), and their portability for displaced populations.

In complex emergencies among the diseases preventable by immunization, measles is one of the biggest killers. In many conflict areas, there are extremely low rates of immunization. EPIs (Expanded Program of Immunizations), or at least measles vaccinations, should be undertaken as early and widely as possible.

Example: *Refugee Policy Group's study of the emergency response in Somalia found that preventive public health and primary care measures could have prevented the deaths of over 150,000 people in 1992.*[62]

Educational materials is another input relatively unattractive to warring factions, though not traditionally considered part of an emergency response package. OFDA cannot be mandated under current regulations to provide such inputs.

Example: *UNICEF and some NGOs are trying to improve the response time of getting educational services started as early as possible. UNICEF's 'school in a box' programs attempts to get teachers back to teaching and materials in the hands of students in situations of instability. "The program aims to put normality back into disaster situations," said a UNICEF official. "It can be introduced immediately in an emergency, anywhere."*

4.4.4 Promote Subsistence and Protect Livelihoods

Responding to all assessed needs is impossible, as needs in many war-torn societies are theoretically infinite. A crucial alternative framework for response is that of protecting livelihoods and preventing further degeneration of a community's capacity to adapt to chronic crisis and manage its own response to these crisis cycles. "Any means which can be provided to help people to be self-supporting should be utilized," says the regional director of an international agency. "This allows people to assume roles and responsibilities, to have dignity. Aid must be targeted to the globality of the human problem." Another rationale for increasing the ratio of non-food to food inputs is the minimal military ramifications inherent in most non-food rehabilitative aid. One donor agency claims to be getting out of food aid altogether. "The military is not interested in our rehabilitative inputs. This way we are re-empowering local structures."

Example: *At times the Sobat River in southern* ***Sudan*** *and the Juba River in* ***Somalia*** *have been teeming with fish while trucks and planes brought in food that was to be diverted in large quantities. Some agencies have provided hooks, nets and twine, and creative offshoots such as bush shops and fishing export businesses have resulted, but food aid has been the predominant response in terms of overall resources.*

Beyond subsistence, there is tremendous potential for wealth creation in Somalia. Commercial fishing, agricultural diversification, and livestock exports all provide attractive livelihoods, particularly for young members of militias.

Providing rehabilitative inputs to women's groups and women as heads of households is critical if communities are to adapt to crises. In complex emergencies women shoulder an even greater burden in terms of household food security due to the absence of men. Even in an emergency context, income generation projects can provide purchasing power for families who cannot access their entire food needs through their own production or through the market.

Example: *OLS has evolved significantly from a near-total commitment to humanitarian services (primarily free food distribution) to wider development goals, including food security, capacity-building and effective targeting. OLS has increasingly emphasized inputs for food production, which local people need and warring parties are less likely to divert.*

As part of a broader strategy of subsistence restoration, some agencies operating in Western Equatoria in southern ***Sudan*** *are encouraging surplus food production to help restore some of the commercial networks which pre-existed the war. World Vision buys food from Yambio District and moves it to Tonj, reducing externally provided food aid. OFDA incorporated this strategy of increasing local food production in potentially surplus areas since early 1993, with the objective of replacing imported emergency food with local production. (OLS and many of its member NGOs also implemented the strategy.) But recently, OFDA has reinterpreted its mandate, saying such agricultural assistance is too developmental. This goes against the recommendations of its own major 1995 evaluation of the U.S. response in southern Sudan.*

"There is such a dearth of resources for rehabilitation and so much for relief; it's feast and famine," commented an OFDA official. "We should be able to hold on to some of the avalanche of emergency funding and to consciously do rehabilitation." But "the OFDA mandate limits the possibilities of rehabilitation," added a USAID field officer. "More decision-making authority must be devolved to the field offices. Aid levels should be set in Washington and determinations about how to spend that aid done locally." "Not unless it offers results," responded a senior OFDA official.

"The DARTs have difficulty moving towards the promotion of self-reliance, as does OFDA," said a field officer for an NGO. "The transition to OTI activities takes too long. OFDA should be moving in that direction much earlier. It's unnecessary bureaucratic division having OFDA, OTI and USAID all with separate mandates. The dichotomy simply prohibits rapid movement into rehabilitative components." A regional manager of an NGO pointed out, "OFDA has been reasonably stretching the envelope on rehabilitation, but this is colored by the need to pretend that they are doing blankets, food and medicines." NGOs have more flexibility in carrying out the full range of possible activities. For example, the main food-moving NGOs in Rwanda have all decided to move out of food aid by the end of 1995.

One regional food security expert felt progress was too slow: "Agencies are often too lazy to build developmental objectives into their emergency programs. Donors should encourage agencies to imbue these principles earlier on." But other agencies are moving toward making the incorporation of developmental objectives into relief a standard practice. There are low-cost/high-impact interventions which can greatly reduce vulnerability, and which many agencies are carrying out. These are classic development-in-relief, portable interventions, such as fishing nets and livestock vaccinations.

4.5. Targeting and Distribution Methods

Section 4.3 covers movement of commodities to affected areas; this section looks at methodologies of getting assistance directly into the hands of affected populations. Again, decisions about how and to whom aid is targeted can have important ramifications on the balance of authority at the local level. Some key principles are operative here: promoting gender sensitivity; demanding independent management; supporting alternative structures and moderate voices. Also, agencies should improve targeting by making registration, distribution, and monitoring more transparent and informing local people of their rights.[63]

4.5.1 Understand social patterns

It is imperative for agencies to understand "who are the likely winners and losers" to develop distribution structures which target those most seriously affected by conflict. Identifying the differentiation in suffering within a community along class and identity lines will minimize the offtake of aid to warring parties.

It is also necessary that agencies understand the internal social relations within a community that often pre-determine who will receive what in any given distribution. Duffield notes, "Local actors will make decisions according to relations of entitlement based on a combination of political and ethnic considerations, together with labor input and social debt."[64]

Example: *As the 1980s progressed, donors increasingly used NGOs to deliver commodities to famine-affected populations in government-held areas of* ***Ethiopia****, bypassing the host government to the maximum extent possible. This is in contrast to the distribution structures in the rebel-held areas of Ethiopia and Eritrea, where local agencies planned, managed and transported everything.*

ICRC institutionally maintained independent control of distribution structures in government areas of Ethiopia. "It was a textbook operation for ICRC," says one Red Cross veteran, "we had independent supervision and beneficiaries from both sides of the conflict." He added, "Independent monitoring and management of aid is critical to avoid charges of

partiality. Aid should be individualized and witnessed as much as possible. Witness is the key to successful distributions."

4.5.2 Target down to families

Getting aid directly in the hands of families -- especially women heads of households -- may serve to evade the interference of military authorities.
Example: *In the* ***Rwandan*** *refugee camps, "We started out by dumping aid at the prefecture level," said a UN official. "We then moved to the commune, and then the cell. Now we are going to individual families. When the distribution mechanism is not at the family level, there is a problem." In the Rwandan refugee camps, distributing goods at higher levels of social organization than the family perpetuates the authority of military and political structure which planned and executed the genocide. It must be noted, though, that the speed with which people crossed the border into Tanzania and Zaire from Rwanda made it imperative to work with whatever structure could be identified in the immediacy of the crisis. "It was only possible to do mass distributions because of the existing structure," says one agency official. "Using existing structures is usually good."*

Besides the overinflated population figures mentioned in the Assessment of Needs section (4.2), another major cause of diversion is flawed distribution. Family ration cards should be put into place as quickly as possible. Verification should be repeated as often as possible.

4.5.3 Target Women

Women should be the actual recipients in most cases, and heavily involved in the planning process. "We can't leave planning in the hands of technocratic food distributors," warns a regional manager of a U.S. agency. Women for the most part are the custodians of the family's welfare and the pillars of the social structure, and usually know best the most vulnerable families in a community. "There are different traditional structures," observes one agency veteran. "Women are more related to the original structures than the visible authorities. Women also traditionally are more egalitarian than men." Women should be leaders in distributions in refugee camps also.

Examples: *Roberta Cohen of the Refugee Policy Group gives two examples: "In camps along the Thai-Cambodian border, the provision of rations to women and girls reduced the diversion of food to the military. In Malawi, when women became involved in distribution, complaints from refugee women about being forced to give sexual favors or money in exchange for food largely ended." She also points out that UNHCR's own Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women suggest that refugee women control distribution structures to the maximum extent possible.*[65]

But elevating women in this way can also expose them to retribution in some places, so agencies must be sensitive to the dangers of external intervention.

4.5.4 Use alternative representation to militias

Some strategies explicitly attempt to build up alternative structures to have input alongside or challenge existing military ones. The development of alternative leadership is more likely where there is a collective strategy among all agencies of refusing to deal with military leaders.

Example: *In the Bahr al-Ghazal region of southern* ***Sudan,*** *WFP has established Relief Committees, popularly elected bodies intended to be involved in the planning and logistics of distribution to the community. The Relief Committees arose from recognition of the diminished authority and effectiveness of chiefs and of the difficulty inherent in micro-managing all distributions.*[66] *The Relief Committees were inspired by Oxfam's Northern Kenyan food aid operation, in which community-based relief committees facilitate both distribution and feedback from recipients about their changing food security.*[67]

Again, a major rationale for this kind of strategy is that the most important insurance policy against diversion and other abuses of humanitarian intent is the encouragement of community empowerment and local groups holding authorities accountable. "The Relief Committees will publicly announce what is being delivered to the community," says one donor official. "This enhances local accountability. It is harder for the SRRA to rip the people off." The Committees are also intended to improve and widen participation in decision-making about the needs of a community, especially promoting women in the process in their role as primary food providers to the household and community.

Seven women and six men comprise each committee. The women make the selection of vulnerable families who will be recipients of a distribution. WFP plans to involve women more in the monitoring in the future. Current responsibilities of a Relief Committee include acting as information sources on the local food economy, as a focal point for communication, and as partners in the distribution process in targeting, developing distribution strategies, managing logistics, screening, and evaluating for future planning.[68]

A major problem with the WFP Relief Committees is that in their hasty creation there was very little coordination between the Relief Committees and existing structures, whether indigenous to the community, part of the SPLA's fledgling local government, or external constructs such as the church-organized Joint Relief Committees. The extent to which these committees will undermine traditional authority structures or truly enable community involvement is not yet determined. "Traditional values have their elements of repression, but there was a certain cohesiveness to the community," says one UN official. "We can't go back to the past, but we must find a way to rediscover those indigenous values." There are other constraints and failures in donor efforts to train and support effective grass-roots local relief committees: limited staff time, dispersed communities difficult to gather quickly for meetings, lack of regular meetings of all involved (WFP, SRRA and RASS, Chiefs, Relief Committee, and the community), lack of field-level training for RASS and SRRA representatives, and WFP/OLS workers' "failure to realize it is their duty to invest the time, patience, and openness to train and support the relief committee members."[69]

Example: *In the* ***Rwandan*** *camps, agencies' promotion of alternative representation takes the form of encouraging women's groups and technical committees (water, health, etc.) in order to bypass the military structures. Agencies have traversed more dangerous ground in attempting to elect or recruit new management structures for the delivery of food aid, the aid of course most coveted by the former government structure in keeping its authority intact. In Goma, for example, one NGO facilitated the creation of groups of young men -- "scouts" -- who were detailed with organizing distribution mechanisms. The scout group had a falling out with the Interahamwe leadership, and the heads of both the local Interahamwe group and the scouts group were executed. The NGO had to evacuate, and all of the other scouts were murdered. The scouts had initially been cultivated as an alternative structure, but eventually took on their own agenda.*

4.5.5 No taxation without representation

Taxation of relief inputs is a given in most war situations. Armed factions simply take a percentage of aid from each recipient. Some of the targeting methods listed above (in section 4.5) may help to create additional accountability and reciprocity between community and authority. When access and distribution modalities ensure that aid reaches the hands of the intended targets, this reduces the major diversions which would otherwise reinforce the unaccountable military culture. Moreover, such targeting forces the authority to approach the local communities and request or demand a certain share. It then becomes a matter of negotiation between authority and community. Some authorities are obviously more abusive than others, and will take what they want. But this in turn has a detrimental impact on the support they receive from their "constituents" in the long term.

4.6 Standardizing Costs, Avoiding Hyper-Inflation and Extortion

In studying the extent to which aid feeds conflict, analysts often tend to focus on the diversion of inputs and other visible signs of sustenance. This may overlook the other economic by-products of agency operations, in particular how they might reinforce military authorities or war economies. Controlling these costs -- especially physical costs -- is a critical element of an overall strategy to reduce aid's contribution to conflict.

It is unworkable to impose standards on a group of agencies with their own domestic mandates and cost structures. "Each organization has its own needs," says one agency regional director. "No decision can be binding. The UN will likely pay double for their own good reasons. Nevertheless, consultative processes and aspirations toward standardization are important. Imposed solutions don't work, but consultation does."

If an attempt is made to negotiate on behalf of agency consortia, there should be total unanimity among all agencies.

Examples: *All agencies operating in Baidoa,* ***Somalia*** *collaborated to cut vehicle costs. Further efforts were being expended in that town before Aidid's invasion in September 1995 to standardize payments between all UN agencies and NGOs. Also in Somalia, UN agencies developed the UN Common Wage Policy in mid-1995, which standardizes the payments to certain categories of national personnel such as security guards, storekeepers and other local support staff. In Rwanda, Save the Children-UK was helpful from the outset in organizing some NGOs inside the country on housing, transport, and local salaries. "It was absolutely the opposite to Somalia," asserts the country director of an NGO which cooperated with SCF-UK's efforts. In Goma, UNHCR and the NGOs got together and put ceilings on what they would pay for labor costs, resulting in a fifty percent reduction in salaries in one day.*

As newcomers arrive, it is important that they consult with agencies operating in the area. In eastern Ethiopia, "We canvassed all of the other agencies and found average costs for different services," said one agency director. Unequal currency exchange is another area which can help underwrite military activities.

Examples: *In government-held areas of Sudan, agencies and donors successfully placed strong pressure on the government to end its dual exchange rate system which was unfair to agencies. In Somalia, major agencies such as UNDP have diversified the currency dealers which they use, making the bids more competitive and attempting to "spread the wealth" over different sub-clans.*

4.7 Monitoring and Evaluation

A commitment to adequate, independent and continuous monitoring and evaluation of programs may reduce aid's contribution to conflict. Once funded, programs often don't undergo prompt review. Monitoring should be conducted concurrent with the program, while subsequent evaluation assesses broader impact.

Example: *The evaluation of the Sudan Emergency Operations Consortium (SEOC) notes that SEOC has inadequately supervised the distribution, and failed to monitor the end use, of food aid in nongovernment areas, which has often been a magnet for disorganized populations. It notes that military and other diversion have left only nutritionally irrelevant amounts of food, transported at high cost, for the many hungry civilians.*

There are far too few resources spend on quality monitoring. Conscientious logistical plans which attempt to reduce diversion and other negative externalities require more monitors, with experience in complex emergency situations.

Examples: *One agency delivering large amounts of food to* ***Rwanda*** *increased its monitoring rapidly directly after the emergency erupted in 1994. "We went from 120 tons/month diversion to five tons/month within Rwanda between July 1993 and January 1994," says a representative of that international agency. "We did it through monitoring. It's monotonous, boring, but critical in cutting down mismanagement."*

However, monitoring can be intimidating, as it can uncover major problems and faults with responding agencies.

Example: *"In* ***Sudan*** *in 1988 and* ***Somalia*** *in 1991, agencies weren't confident to respond not only because of the insecurity and difficulty of access, but also because of a fear of failure and being judged," says the regional director of an international agency. "Monitoring should be oriented to supporting internal evaluation and development, not external audit. Nevertheless, fifteen months after an emergency response begins, we can't claim to outsiders that they should not look at us because we're in an emergency phase."*

The extent to which donor agencies must themselves submit to scrutiny helps dictate the degree of accountability they demand from agencies. USAID and OFDA must concern themselves with US Government Accounting Office audits, with Congressional committees, occasionally with media investigations and a public predisposed to suspicion about foreign aid. "U.S. vigilance is greater because of its political system," explains one NGO executive.

With warring parties ever more sophisticated in manipulating aid for their ends, the need increases for agencies to continuously evaluate the effects of their interventions. Monitoring and evaluation should be supporting agencies in pitching their aid to the correct levels and the targeted populations. Agencies need to be open to the lessons that evaluations uncover. Donors can assist these evaluation processes as well, sometimes simply by asking questions at critical junctures.

Example: *Soon after the humanitarian emergency erupted in* ***Rwanda,*** *USAID/Washington asked field staff whether their aid was benefitting any group dis-proportionately or unfairly. "How sustainable structures are being reinforced should be evaluated earlier on," says a food security advisor. "We need to bring in professionals with a wider vision to review wider impacts, responsibilities and dilemmas of the response."*

4.8 Engagement and Capacity Building With Authorities and Civil Institutions

Engagement describes the process whereby agencies maintain contact with authorities to uphold humanitarian principles and welfare responsibilities. Capacity building refers to the conscious process of strengthening local organizations or mechanisms which can address needs. Engagement and capacity building are key concepts in most attempts to operationalize humanitarian principles. For example, the Providence Principles state: "Humanitarian assistance should enhance, not supplant, local responses." The Mohonk Criteria add: "Humanitarian assistance should strengthen the efforts of local governmental and non-governmental organizations to relieve suffering and build self-reliance." And the Red Cross and NGO Code of Conduct summarizes: "Humanitarian assistance should build on local responses."[70]

This section covers capacity-building both in relation to de facto (state) authorities and wider (non-state) civil institutions. The principal recommendation is that aid with this philosophy is less likely to be misused and less likely to sustain conflict.

4.8.1 Engaging Authorities on their Public Welfare Responsibilities

According to the Geneva Conventions, the responsibility for the welfare of the civilian population is with the authority of that area. They are the first line of response. Nevertheless, humanitarian agencies and donors can be a positive influence in encouraging the fulfillment of these responsibilities. No matter how speculative, agencies have a responsibility to challenge authorities on their public welfare responsibilities.

Example: *Numerous agency representatives in **Angola** refer to the abdication of the government from the social sector and the need for advocacy to reverse negative trends in social spending. One of OFDAs engagement initiatives is pushing the government to pick up a larger percentage of NGO port costs.*

Aid agencies should also engage local communities on their commitment to addressing the needs of their most vulnerable members. As put by a donor official, "Somali society should help its vulnerable groups. The onus of responsibility must be thrown on the community. We can give them ideas, but they should construct their social welfare approaches." Aid providers should then support these local decisions and initiatives.

External engagement and solidarity (tough-minded, demanding accountability and reciprocity) are necessary for effective conflict transformation. Day to day engagement of authorities must strive to contribute to the moving of these authorities from predatory relations with vulnerable populations to relationships built on reciprocity. Although the chances for success are low and the conflicts will not end through this investment of diplomatic capital, any small buttressing of the rebuilding of internal social relations is useful.

The success of interventions is largely determined by the nature of the controlling authorities' relationship with civilian populations. This point is usually overlooked, ignored, or little understood in most analyses of interventions, but it is perhaps in the long run the single most important lesson of all the intervention experience in the Horn.[71]

Example: *A critical experience in this regard is that of **Ethiopia** and **Eritrea** during their long wars. At their very foundation, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front developed the political practice of linking mass mobilization with the provision of public welfare. The EPLF and TPLF provided the bulk of public welfare assistance*

in areas under their control until the mid-1980s as part of their political practice. Significant cross-border assistance didn't come until the conflict had raged for 25 years in Eritrea, and a decade in Tigray. The internationally donated cross-border aid -- channelled through ERA and REST -- after 1985 greatly contributed to containing widespread food insecurity.

The efficiency of the integrated and participatory relief systems of ERA and REST meant that Eritreans did far more with the relatively little international assistance that they received than would have been possible using conventional relief practices. The ultimate effectiveness of ERA and REST was rooted in their decentralized and participatory welfare structures. They contrast with the more typical centralized, non-participatory structures that operated in Ethiopian government areas. A key component of the cross-border operation was that people were urged and assisted to stay in their home areas to maximize production. Secondary distributions and aggressive resettlement were key strategic elements of the humanitarian programs of ERA and REST.

All externally provided resources went directly in support of indigenous political and humanitarian structures, which had a huge impact on building local capacity. Neither the EPLF or TPLF allowed international NGOs to be operational during the 1980s (with the exception of ICRC, briefly), so all implementation was done by ERA and REST and their community-level structures. The Fronts viewed their own approach (marked by community organizing and mobilizing combined with military advance and consolidation) as far superior to one that ceded control to international agencies.

4.8.2 Engaging Non-Reciprocating Authorities

The antithesis of these organizing principles can be found throughout the rest of the region -- mass mobilization by coercion (Sudan) or by the promise of booty from banditry and extortion (Somalia) and no internal public welfare mandates or reciprocity with local populations under the control (or rather domination) of local or regional authorities. Quite obviously, where there are abusive authorities, there is the consistent abuse of aid. Governments, rebel organizations, and militia groups who fit this description abound throughout the Horn. At present there is little political engagement of the military leadership of any of these authority structures.

Engagement of these authorities can take many forms. As mentioned, when it is done now it is usually through the humanitarian wings of rebel movements, not the military leadership. For local capacity building to succeed fully, these military authorities need to be diplomatically engaged constantly at the political level not only on the need for freedom and space at the local level, but also on the development of reciprocal relationship with their own people.

Engagement requires coordination among all actors. The embassies have to be involved, and donors have to be willing to follow up "with some resource injection as a carrot," said a former UN consultant in Ethiopia. For example, some donors suggest that repatriation is a condition of more assistance to the government of Rwanda, but then they are sometimes unwilling to fully confront the RPF on essential prerequisites for repatriation. "Approaching these thorny issues solely from a humanitarian perspective is problematic," says a UN official. "Participation and accountability are deeply political."

Donor agencies occasionally play hardball with authorities. Natsios says that when he was OFDA Director, he went to the Mozambican government and demanded that it repay the U.S. government for diverted commodities.[72] After a field visit to southern Sudan by Nan Borton, OFDA's current Director, during which a major diversion by rebel forces occurred, OFDA cut off

funds for the capacity building project for the rebel humanitarian wings, SRRA and RASS, administered by OLS.

"Whatever reforms are made by the SPLA result from donor pressures," says a long time observer of southern Sudan. "The SPLA is walking a fine line; they're not committed either way." Part of the rationale for a newly created NGO coordination mechanism in southern Sudan is to facilitate unified and direct engagement with the SRRA. "Donors should be sensitive to the unique operating conditions and give more space for NGO access," asserts an NGO country director.

4.8.3 Capacity Building with Authorities

Emergency aid should be linked with institutional support so that local capacity to manage social assistance is reinforced.[73] Sustainability is a key rationale for investing in the support of local capacity. There is great variation in the way different international agencies address this issue. For some, capacitation is an early priority; for others, maintaining control and circumventing authority are preferable. NGO circumvention of authorities has become a major issue in the Horn, especially in areas where governments or authorities believe that NGOs should not be replacing authorities in their capacities as planners, assessors, implementors and evaluators.

Some agencies' vision of capacity building goes no further than handing out cash to relief wings of rebel organizations. If a decision is made by an agency or agency consortium to support a capacity building agenda, these players must then create the capacity within themselves to carry out such an agenda responsibly. Sycophantic solidarity is a damaging substitute for accountable engagement, as agencies doing the former makes the legitimate work of the latter much more difficult. A principal failure of many agencies is that they do not build up their own capacity to in turn build the capacity of authorities in their locale. This requires a staffing response; someone should be hired early on in an emergency to address capacity building questions across the board.

Another approach to capacity building in divided or collapsed states is sectoral. Capacity building should be integrated into the planning processes of each sectoral response to emergencies: food security, water, sanitation, health, veterinary, etc. Training and the encouragement of responsibility-taking of local structures should be a part of all responses. If a major objective of capacity building is to assist communities in managing the response to chronic crisis, this approach makes eminent sense. For example, in anticipation of the recreation of a collapsed health service, capacity building can take the form of the training of medical personnel, the standardizing of health guidelines, and the discussion of how to restructure health provision in a manner relevant to limited-resource, highly unstable environments. "This is the best long-term investment in accountability," said a donor official in Ethiopia. "We should always engage the lowest level authority structure to develop the constituency for the respect for humanitarian principles."

One of the most important elements of a capacity building strategy is for agencies not to create a local 'brain drain' by taking the most able staff from their indigenous institutions or governments and paying them much more in an agency setting.

4.8.4 Capacity Building of Civil Society

External programs that invest in developing local people and organizations adapt best to crises.[74] In the context of emergency programming, there are many opportunities to support indigenous non-governmental forms of social organization. In every society, there are traditional

mechanisms of kinship and self-help which are often the primary contributors to a community's survival in the context of a complex emergency. "Supporting civil organizations represents development theory in practice, transported back to the rehabilitative phase," said an NGO manager in Rwanda. Even in the structure of a food distribution, promoting alternative representation (women's groups, technical committees, traditional social networks) can build local capacity and create an alternative to the military structures. "International NGOs have a big role to play in empowering dispossessed elements," says an Ethiopian diplomat. "Aid should continuously be reevaluated to see how external involvement can support empowerment." Another advisor to international agencies in Ethiopia is more adamant: "Let bilateral aid support local administrations. International NGOs should support civil society and indigenous NGOs, not state structures."

Mary Anderson outlines further rationales for making capacity building a central part of emergency response:

> Education, skills, and general know-how are capacities that, when applied to the physical resources of land, tools, seeds and equipment, affect people's productivity. Family and community structures through which people gain both physical and psychological support often make the difference as to who suffers most -- and least -- in emergencies. People's experiences in decision-making and management affect their sense of efficacy and control and also have an important effect on productivity in normal times and on survival during emergencies.[75]

But for many authorities, indigenous organizations represent a threat to bases of power and fund raising, which makes a local capacity building strategy extremely difficult and sometimes dangerous (for the participants) to undertake.

Furthermore, as Minear and Weiss describe, there are advantages and drawbacks to using indigenous agencies. On the positive side, they note, local NGOs are directly connected to the population and thus best suited to meet the communities' needs, offering leadership with ties to the community, a realistic vision of the communities' future, and a natural incentive to sustain and guarantee reconstruction, development, and peace. On the negative side, these groups may be too parochial or political to effectively access outside resources. Their societies' customs may appear questionable to the international community.[76]

Meaningful capacity building requires long time horizons and liberal allowance for mistakes and problems. In many places, traditions of social organization have been bludgeoned by divide-and-rule authoritarian governmental or rebel structures, creating a legacy of mistrust, lethargy and corruption. Supporting civil society requires patience by agencies in learning local structures of legitimate representation.

Example: *In Angola, SCF(UK) recruited a rural rehabilitation consultant in Huambo Province to examine traditional practices and assess the viability of local structures for partnership.*

In situations of tremendous upheaval, schools are often one of the only civil structures remaining. To support community initiatives to recreate local elementary schools lays the groundwork for providing an alternative voice in a community to military imperatives.

Supporting religious institutions is another important component of local capacity building. Whether a mosque or Koranic school in Somalia or a local church group in Angola or Rwanda, they provide a potential balance to military authority in many war-torn societies.

Capacity building of women's organizations at the local level is critical in building an alternative voice. Furthermore, introducing capacity building objectives for women as a part of all sectoral plans is important in mainstreaming women's participation and leadership. One women leader stresses the need to move beyond the elite in capital cities: "Capacity building should be targeted at the grassroots. Traditional Birth Attendants, widow's associations and women's farming groups should be supported. Agencies need to assess the capacity that already exists and support that." Credit is an important form of assistance to women's organizations.

4.8.5 Addressing the Tradeoff Between Control and Empowerment

There is widespread agreement on the imperative not to supplant local capacity. There are even strong arguments for allowing greater levels of initial inefficiency on the grounds of building capacity. Institution building takes time, money and patience. Even ICRC, legendary for their external control, has changed the way it operates to more fully incorporate local involvement. "The impact of our aid is positively correlated with the degree of national involvement in the operation," says a regional manager for ICRC.

External control and local capacity building in emergency situations are not mutually exclusive. Agencies should attempt to maximize the latter while still retaining the right of independent assessment and monitoring. For Minear and Weiss, the "tradeoffs between rapid responses and longer-term benefits may be more theoretical than real." Relief efforts that incorporate local people and institutions are more successful and need not entail major delays.[77]

Speed and accountability are two elements which need to be balanced when trying to maximize capacity building. The process is invariably slower when trying to involve local structures, but what remains after the wave of external responders is gone will be largely dependent on the level of collaboration with these local structures.

There is a great diversity of opinion about the timing of capacity building. "Releasing control earlier is less costly and less disruptive," says the regional head of an agency. "The overall goal of assisting self-reliance is best served by building local mechanisms." On the other hand, "It's hard to justify putting in major time to build local capacity in the emergency phase," says the Country Director of a U.S. NGO.

Some agency personnel worry about the level of pressure local organizations are under from their own communities. For example, according to one donor official in Ethiopia, "If the Joint Relief Partnership (a negotiated access church initiative) was under pressure, they would feed non-targeted populations and wouldn't tell us, whereas CARE might tell us if facing a similar situation."

4.9 Human Rights Monitoring, Advocacy and Capacity Building

Human rights monitoring and advocacy are critical components of the international response to complex emergencies, since abuses may signal the onset or escalation of conflict. However, the task is frequently problematic. Aid agencies may jeopardize their operations by publicizing abuses. Moreover, they may not sufficiently address the importance of building indigenous capacities to deal with abuses. Local perceptions of group and individual rights are often little understood by outsiders and may be used to justify certain abuses. "The idea that an interest in human rights is a western import serves the interests of local violators of human rights."[78] Finally, humanitarian focus on individuals' rights can ignore and undermine survival strategies based on commitment to group survival and preservation of a way of life, as, for

example, among the Dinka in Sudan. Aid groups should recall the UN Refugee Convention's right to "maintenance of culture" and consider focusing on community, rather than individual, rights, where individuals' vulnerability stems from communal dissolution.[79]

Famine early warning should systematically incorporate the human rights surveillance which it now parallels, making famine indicative of forcible resettlements, attacks on markets, and resource thefts, all just as crucial as weather monitoring. This requires trained local participants, who may be the only logistically feasible data sources in volatile, insecure low-intensity conflicts.[80] In addition, donor agencies should be vigilant to incipient abuses such as gross labor exploitation and market distortion as much as fighting or use of food as a weapon of war.[81]

The mandates of most operational agencies prevent them from speaking out aggressively and publicly on human rights issues. But many of these agencies provide key information to human rights monitoring group. There arguably should be greater coordination between those that can respond publicly and those that cannot. For example, MSF should be able to withdraw, as it did from Ethiopia in 1984 or Goma ten years later, and shed light on particularly egregious practices, while other agencies continue to provide needed assistance, serve as witnesses, and channel information to human rights organizations. Over time, all agencies must make cost-benefit analyses of their interventions: "If we're not helping in silence, maybe we should leave and speak out," says a USAID official.

One donor official observes, "Human rights is becoming a bigger and bigger part of our response. Bernard Kouchner says the EC should send hundreds of monitors to emergency situations; this is much cheaper than sending troops." The current standoff over the return of the Rwandan refugees is largely dependent on the perceptions by the refugees of the human rights situation they face upon their return.

A UNICEF discussion paper urges active protection of children in emergencies, grounded in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and international humanitarian law and principles. Complex emergencies are breaking down the former dichotomy between human rights and aid operations as massive, systemic rights abuses force donors to confront the "sheer inadequacy of providing goods and services without seeking to protect rights" and make the latter a fundamental aspect of assistance. The paper notes that relief workers must pro-actively advocate and educate about rights and systematically document violations. Nationals should provide education--to defuse charges of imposing foreign values--which should reach relief staff; local government, rebel, military, NGO, church, and traditional leaders; and women's groups and influential professionals.

London-based African Rights presents a different model of how human rights organizations may operate. Their Nuba Mountains (Sudan) work provides an example. There, they have established a local human rights monitoring system, human rights education programs, and are supporting the development of a judiciary. "This approach is based on the belief that it is inappropriate to advocate an 'international rescue' without developing a local capacity that can ensure that it is the Nuba themselves, and not the international agencies, that dictate the priorities," writes Alex de Waal. "We also think that it is inappropriate to separate human rights from humanitarian action, and have tried to integrate them within one program."[82] It remains to be seen whether this model is only viable in cross-border operations in defiance of sovereignty, or whether these kinds of initiatives can be undertaken in the context of a negotiated access framework.

4.10 Coordination

It is pointless for OFDA to achieve "aid with integrity" if conflict is to be inadvertently fuelled by other agencies or donors. In order to fully address the risk of aid sustaining conflict, all parties need to improve coordination at different levels. First donors need to address coordination between and among themselves at national, regional and international levels. Second, donors need to improve their internal coordination between different government departments.

However, coordination is a concept approved by all but defined by few. Certainly it involves greater cooperation both in communication and decision-making. But the notion of leadership is controversial, and many donors privately admit that coordination in the sense of loss of sovereignty is the last thing they want. On issues which require coordination, an open, direct, immediate chain of command is invaluable. "However unfashionable they may be in management theory," writes Natsios, "simple and lean hierarchical organizations are needed in complex emergencies."[83]

For OFDA the challenge is playing an effective coordinating role from a relatively modest power base within the U.S. government. In-country emergency operations, especially where it is the only or best-resourced U.S. government agency may offer OFDA a more influential role. In their grant-making machinery OFDA should consider requiring NGOs to be more explicit about their policy on coordination.

At an international level, the role of the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) is pivotal. Its coordination role in the field could use clarification, since it currently varies from emergency to emergency. UN agencies responding to emergencies -- UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP and WFP -- need better coordination which needs to begin within the UN Secretariat, most logically by DHA. However, to date, the DHA has had neither the resources nor the political strength to carry out this role.

Internally, the need for coordination is just as pressing, and elusive. For example, coordination among Food for Peace and OFDA has been problematic, with FFP often providing food to an NGO and then coming to OFDA for management funding, without consulting with OFDA at the project application review stage. Agencies within an individual country's aid apparatus need to cooperate in jointly reviewing proposals and jointly evaluating projects. Certainly when it comes to imposing conditionalities on aid, coordination is critical (see section 5).

At the outset of major emergencies (preferably before, if early warning systems are utilized and heeded) which draw dozens of agencies to the scene, coordination over a rational division of responsibilities is critical in avoiding manipulation by warring factions over the placement of agency resources and other unintended consequences of large-scale humanitarian responses. Donors, DHA, and veteran agencies should all strive to increase the opportunities for coordination, to come to a consensus on a division of labor, and to facilitate discussion on program areas. Even if only the major agencies agree on a coordination mechanism, their leadership may influence others to cooperate.

Examples: *A central feature of coordination is information. The framework provided by the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative could be useful in improving the communication lines throughout that region, in turn assisting in the coordination of regional planning.*

With little clarity about judicial processes in ***Rwanda****, most (new-case) refugees in Zaire and Tanzania are unwilling to return. "The coordination among donors is pitiful," says an*

agency official. "If donors would coordinate their aid in addressing [degrees of culpability], they could make a major impact." The lack of coordination in response to the Kibeho massacre is another case-in-point of lack of donor collaboration to achieve agreed-upon purposes, as is a failure to coordinate regarding the response to internally displaced persons. "UNREO has no resources, and works by month-to-month contracts," says one donor official. "They should have had technical people to help coordinate each sector." One exception was the coordination role played by Charles Petrie of DHA, who has earned universal accolades from agency personnel. "Petrie was a real catalyst for INGOs, local NGOs and the government," says one agency country director. "People were willing to come together."

The ***Somali*** *Aid Coordination Body possesses a mandate to do meaningful coordination. "The most positive aspect of the SACB is the acceptance by donors of their responsibility," says an agency manager. One of the most important aspects of the development of common policy through the SACB is the insulation against manipulation: "The Somalis know it exists; they can't manipulate agencies one by one," asserts a donor official. But the leadership style of the secretariat is forceful and controversial, and some agencies feel it is extremely inappropriate. Furthermore, the effectiveness of coordination of the SACB suffered at the end of 1994 when the decision-making authority was moved from Nairobi to Geneva. Some agency personnel also charge that the SACB meetings are completely procedural, and "there is very little discussion about the substance of the needs of Somalia," says one agency consultant. The same charge is made by other agency managers regarding the donor round table in Rwanda as well.*

In 1994, OLS initiated regular meetings to coordinate specific aspects of the humanitarian response in southern ***Sudan****. The OLS Director insists that all agencies, even those not in OLS, must broadly agree on Southern Sudanese food aid requirements lest the warring parties play agencies off against each other.*[84]

Although OLS possesses the official role for coordinating agencies in southern Sudan, twelve NGOs have created an NGO forum to address the gaps in coordination which they perceive to be inhibiting performance, and to dialogue with donors. The group supports OLS and the access it provides, as well as supporting the rehabilitative strategy in part devised by OFDA (including the development-in-relief concept) and a common NGO stance regarding abuses of humanitarian assistance. "NGOs want to meet regularly with donors to sensitize them to the difficulties of being in the field in a war zone," says an official of a U.S. agency.

Coordinating on a regional level is equally important. Exchanging information among agencies between countries and between refugee camps and countries of origin should be more consciously undertaken. Donors should take some responsibility for coordination at this level.

Example: *UNHCR is a key UN agency in regional planning and coordination. CARE is developing a regional response plan for the Great Lakes Region, and MSF-H has spearheaded a regional coordination exercise for that region to improve information flow.*

5. CONCLUSIONS: MANAGING WIDER POLITICAL AGENDAS AND CONDITIONALITIES

Under what conditions should aid be halted? Section 4 outlined ways in which aid should be modified to avoid inadvertent contribution to conflict. This section deals with the conditions under which aid should be discontinued or suspended. Increasing involvement in complex political emergencies has complicated the role of humanitarian aid. OFDA must not only manage the inadvertent political outcomes outlined in section 2, but also deal with the intended political goals attached by higher-order policy-makers in government. A former head of OFDA has listed a number of the potential uses of disaster assistance for diplomatic or political ends:[85]

- a preventive measure to stave off chaos in an unraveling society,
- a confidence-building measure during political negotiations,
- a means to protect democratic and economic reforms,
- a way to implement peace accords that the U.S. has mediated,
- an effort to mitigate the effects of economic sanctions on the poor, where sanctions serve geo-political ends, and
- a means to encourage a political settlement, as carrots to contending factions.

He argues that not more than one of these objectives can be safely accommodated by aid missions, and that the political objective must also be subordinated to the humanitarian mission. However, any attachment of such objectives to humanitarian missions raises problematic issues, especially if conditionality is involved. The use of aid conditionalities for development and security assistance are well established tools of foreign policy. Most recently, in discussion on aid to North Korea, linkage with progress on nuclear issues has been suggested. On the other hand humanitarian assistance to areas of the world not of vital strategic importance has been largely exempt from such overt manipulation. Nevertheless, beyond donor political agendas, many agencies experiment with aid conditionalities on the ground, often operating outside of any agreed-upon framework.

Broadly speaking, there are four areas of humanitarian aid conditionality to be considered. First, there are the diplomatic or political considerations: should aid be used as an incentive for peace, for example, to reward cooperation with peace negotiations? Second, there are human rights considerations: should aid be refused to deter abuses? Third, there are operational issues: should aid be suspended because of threats to the security of aid personnel? Deciding whether aid should be withheld because through abuse it inadvertently sustains conflict now constitutes a fourth condition. It is possible that all four conditions may be applicable in a single policy decision about how to proceed on a particular emergency.

Example: *In January 1996, the OFDA-funded SCF(US) projects in UNITA areas of Angola (Kuanza Sul Province)were suspended due to a pattern of staff harassment, diversion and other abuses.*

It should be noted this fourth conditionality only refers to obvious abuse of humanitarian aid. Judgments about aid contributing to the dynamics of conflict in less overt ways are less likely to be grounds for cessation and more a question of of applying the imperatives in section 4.

5.1 Conditioning aid on progress in peace initiatives

Continuous cycles of conflict produce impatience and frustration on the part of donors and agencies, as they repeatedly place band-aids over the wounds opened and re-opened by the fighting. Should aid providers be more assertive in addressing these conflicts? Are there situations when humanitarian assistance should be conditioned on progress toward peace, or at least cessation of hostilities at the local or national level? Any exercise of conditionality in this arena requires a sophisticated grasp of the local context.

Example: *The **Sudan** Emergency Operations Consortium (SEOC) emulated the "Tough Love" approach initiated by the ecumenical agencies involved in the Emergency Relief Desk (ERD) Ethiopian cross-border relief operation in the late 1980s civil war. Lutheran World Relief noted in 1989 that prolonged, expensive relief could prolong conflict by enabling warring parties to evade their responsibility to civilians, and urged agencies seriously to consider withholding aid if peace efforts failed; the ecumenical agencies maintained this stance throughout the war. Lutheran World Relief's Executive Director in 1991 declared that the time had come to begin to "question the effectiveness of paying endless millions for humanitarian aid which may only be exacerbating and prolonging the conflict . . . [and maybe] for humanitarian assistance to be tied to some strings." He went so as far as to disavow the adage that food should not be used as a political weapon to urge its positive use to force peace negotiations.*[86] *In Sudan the LWF/WS similarly worried that the expensive Juba airlift could prolong the war and, in forming the SEOC, threatened to withdraw aid unless the warring parties permitted road transport.*[87]

At the level of inter-communal conflict, sections of this report have examined using the conditioning of animal health services as an entry point to address constant cattle raiding. "Maybe we should go in and ask the community what they will guarantee in the way of a good operating environment," says one war-zone veterinarian. "Let them determine the ground rules, the sanctions. Then if a raid happens and they have promised not to raid, maybe we should withhold services from the raiders." Or even more pro-actively, says an agency country director, "We could build into the program that the price of cattle vaccination is to not raid."

Once an acute emergency phase is over, the opportunities to introduce these kinds of conditions increase. "The emergency mandate is to save the drowning person," says one donor official. "When the person is out of the water, we need to get tougher politically. We shouldn't go beyond the basics until there is peace." A regional director for an agency cautions, "Downgrading to emergency bandaid inputs is very dangerous. We have to focus on rehabilitation." Yet another nuance is expressed by an ICRC representative: "We cannot become part of a political decision-making process. The independence of aid must be retained. Political decisions must be separated from basic rights to aid. Aid workers lose their security if identified with the politics of the international community." Another agency field worker concurred: "You can't use relief as a weapon," meaning emergency aid should not be used as a tool of peace-makers. The difficulty of reaching a consensus on this issue is summed up by an agency country director: "The people who don't care and are not affected are the rulers. The people would suffer. But there should be political conditions on moving up the continuum."

Positive conditionality is utilized more frequently, such as the SACB's condition for rehabilitation only in secure areas. "If you do X, we'll give you Y," suggests a UN regional official, noting that land tenure and arrest procedures should be items for consideration in Rwanda. A question underlying positive conditionality is whether the pattern of incentives can be changed sufficiently in order to change the behavior of an authority. Can an interest be created in peace? Can war prosecutors benefit from peace under certain conditions? Should carrots be offered in the emergency phase? Only case-by-case judgments at country level can provide reliable answers to such critical questions.

5.2 Conditioning aid on humanitarian grounds

As described, humanitarian assistance is usually by far the largest input into a war-torn society from external donors. Food and medical aid is particularly valuable to combatants, and they hold tremendous potential leverage for conditionalities based on humanitarian principle and reconciliation.

In what situations, if any, should aid be cut off? "There is a growing consensus on stopping aid for objectives of humanitarian principle," says one agency country director. "Aid should only be suspended, though, within the framework of an agreement with authorities." The decision to stop assistance is often traumatic for an agency. The losses of access, information, and witness are usually judged to be so grave that most agencies will not completely withdraw from an area unless the emergency is completely over or the security situation is untenable. Alternatively, if an agency is not achieving anything positive, is it de facto condoning the situation by remaining and not speaking out?

Example: *In the context of* ***Sudan*** *questions about the use of aid to underwrite Khartoum's war efforts remain unanswered. To what extent is the international community assuming the public welfare responsibilities of the Sudanese government, thereby freeing resources for the war? Are aid flights from Khartoum to the south supplying soldiers in government garrisons rather than civilians in need? Is money spent in the pursuit of aid projects providing the government with a source of hard currency used to prosecute the war, and are donated food stocks in the north freeing Sudanese grain production for export? If donors cannot independently investigate and resolve these issues satisfactorily, their aid programs to the north may be compromised. Yet any cut-off or suspension should be conditioned scrupulously on consistent abuse of access, accountability and reciprocity, and the same principles should be applied to aid to the south.*[88]

Clearly, decisions about withdrawal should be coordinated among agencies. ***Example:*** *When MSF withdrew from Goma because they did not want to be implicated in the reforming and re-arming of the ex-government, they raised public awareness of a critical political problem. Agencies which stayed behind continue to provide needed humanitarian inputs, maintain a semblance of regional stability, and (some) quietly provide information to human rights organizations about the camps. If donor countries continue to evade this political dilemma, they should at least help to coordinate a division of responsibility between public condemnation and quiet assistance.*

5.3 Conditioning aid on security of aid operations

In highly insecure situations, donors usually are dependent on the degree of risk NGOs are prepared to accept in how much of an affected population are able to be reached. Agencies usually carry out their own subjective cost-benefit analyses regarding whether they will or can respond to a particular crisis.

Example: *In Liberia between 1990-3 aid agencies were subjected to fluctuating amounts of harassment and robbery by warring factions. Individual agencies halted and re-started their operations according to circumstances and judgements of risk and opportunity. By October 1994 the harassment had become so severe that operations outside the Monrovia security zone were virtually impossible. With aid diversion running at rates close to 50% according to some reports, debates raged in the aid community about "how much was too much." Eventually, under the auspices of the UNDP, all agencies withdrew operations until security improved. The aid ban*

was in fact an admission of the status quo, and several months passed before any access was feasible. There is no way to measure how far the ban contributed to the 1995 peace agreement.

5.4 Conditioning aid on the non-aggravation of conflict

The preceding sections and examples have already cited concerns about aid and its unintentional effects. When does aid do more harm than good? Progress in peace negotiations, undesirable support of factions and human rights abusers, and dangers to aid personnel are all likely to be factors in any decision about withdrawal or cessation. There is increasing interest in looking at humanitarian principles as a guide for response. The blatant aggravation of conflict through abuse of humanitarian aid must now be added to the list. Less overt contributions to the dynamics of conflict are, on the other hand, better dealt with by the more astute modifications of aid suggested in section 4.

However, principles and codes are only two-dimensional tools, that provide check-lists for professionals but do not help them weigh competing factors. Evidence collected for this paper indicates that there is no substitute for a detailed knowledge of the local context, built up over time with appropriate use of local expertise, and applied to aid programs that strive to build in the capacity to continue once external aid ceases.

ENDNOTES

[1]See, for example, Mark Duffield, "Complex Emergencies and the Crisis of Developmentalism," IDS Bulletin: Linking Relief and Development 25, no.4, October 1994, 37-45. See also, Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, "Humanitarianism Unbound?", discussion Paper no.5 (London: Africa Rights, 1994).

[2]See, for example Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Aid on the Front Line," Washington Post, 26 January 1996, A23.

[3]John E. Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1995 (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995): 31.

[4]John Prendergast was able to collect much of the data for this paper in the Greater Horn while on a U.S. Institute of Peace grant. As part of the grant he is writing a book on minimizing aid's negative externalities in the Greater Horn. Colin Scott worked in West Africa for Save the Children (UK) and recently completed research for the Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, on the Liberia crisis. Acknowledgements are due to all these institutions.

[5]See Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community, (Boulder: Westview, 1995): 1-12.

[6]See Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense william J. Perry, Fortune 500 Forum, Philadelphia, PA, November 3, 1994, News Release from the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

[7]On "A Global Forum with President Clinton," CNN,May 3,1994.

[8]See, for example, J. Brian Attwood, "Suddenly Chaos," The Washington Post, July 31, 1994, C9.

[9]USAID Guidelines for Strategic Plans, Technical Annex E: Humanitarian Assistance, February 1995, 7.

[10]OFDA, Field Operations Guide, June 1994, iii.

[11]OFDA, Guiding Principles (draft) 1995, 1.

[12]Andrew Natsios, "The Politics of United States Disaster Response," Mediterranean Quarterly 6, no.2 (Spring 1995): 46.

[13]The conceptual framework here owes much to the prior work of Mary Anderson. See, for example International Assistance and Conflict: An Exploration of Negative Impacts (to follow). Much of the material comes from John Prendergast's study for the United States Institute of Peace.

[14]*See Colin Scott, Larry Minear, and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Action and Security in Liberia 1989-1994 (Providence: Watson Institute, 1995).*

[15]J. Macrae and A. Zwi (1994) "War and Hunger" in J. Macrae & A. Zwi, eds., *War & Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies*, 19.

[16]For a classic case study of this in a town called Yuai, see Human Rights Watch's study on Sudan: Jemera Rone and John Prendergast, Civilian Devastation, Human Rights Abuses in Sudan, 1994.

[17] *Interview, 9/25/95.*

[18]*D. Keen & K. Wilson (1994) "Engaging with Violence: A Reassessment of Relief in Wartime" in J. Macrae & A. Zwi, eds., War & Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies*, 212-13.

[19] *News from Africa Watch, April 15, 1993, 8.*
[20] *Andrew Natsios, "Humanitarian Relief Interventions in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos," Princeton U. conference, March 16, 1995, 5.*
[21] *A. de Waal (1994) "Dangerous Precedents? Famine Relief in Somalia 1991-93" in J. Macrae & A. Zwi, eds., War & Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies,* 146.
[22] *MSF (1995) Deadlock* at 8-9.
[23] *MSF (1995) Deadlock* at 9 no. 18.
[24] Interview with Andrew Natsios, 9/25/95.
[25] M. Duffield (1994) "The Political Economy of Internal War: Asset Transfer, Complex Emergencies and International Aid" in J. Macrae & A. Zwi, eds., *War & Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies,* 60-61. Duffield notes that Sudan in 1988 restricted aid transactions to an official rate of Ls. 4.4 to $1 while the parallel market rate was 17; Ethiopia in the 1980s charged roughly three times the market rate for Birr.
[26] A.de Waal (1994) "Dangerous Precedents? Famine Relief in Somalia 1991-93" in J. Macrae & A. Zwi, eds., *War & Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies,* 146-47.
[27] Mark Adams and Mark Bradbury, "Conflict and Development," Background Paper for UNICEF/NGO Workshop, New York, April 27 1995, 38.
[28] Adams & Bradbury (1995) 45.
[29] Anderson (1994b) at 12-13.
[30] J. Macrae and A. Zwi (1994) "War and Hunger" in J. Macrae & A. Zwi, eds., *War & Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies,* 27, citing D. Keen & K. Wilson (1994) "Engaging with Violence: A Reassessment of Relief in Wartime" in *ibid,* 209-21.
[31] *For a discussion of these issues, see Larry Minear, Humanitarian Action in the Former Yugoslavia: The UN's Role 1991-1993 (Watson Institute, Providence, 1994): 121-123.*
[32] See for example, The Providence Principles, The Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Action, The IFRC Code of Conduct.
[33] Iain Levine, "Report on Workshop on Humanitarian Principles for Sudanese NGOs," mimeo, April 1995, 8.
[34] K. Menkhaus (1995) *Conflict, Peacebuilding, and International Aid: The State of the Art* (Draft Manuscript on File with Author) at 2.
[35] J. Macrae and A. Zwi (1994) "War and Hunger" in J. Macrae & A. Zwi, eds., *War & Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies,* 28-29.
[36] Interview, 9/25/95.
[37] Mark Duffield and John Prendergast, "Sovereignty and Intervention After the Cold War," **Middle East Report**, March-June 1994, 15.
[38] J. Macrae and A. Zwi (1994) "War and Hunger" in J. Macrae & A. Zwi, eds., *War & Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies,* 24.
[39] See International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, World Disasters Report 1994, pp21-pp32 and World Disasters Report 1995, 145-147 for an update.
[40] Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community, 1995, 209.

[41]Sudan Emergency Operations Consortium Review, John Ryle, Mark Duffield, Helen Young, Geneva/London (1995): 193.
[42]SEOC Review (1995): 221.
[43]D. Keen & K. Wilson (1994) "Engaging with Violence: A Reassessment of Relief in Wartime" in J. Macrae & A. Zwi, eds., *War & Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies*, 209.
[44]Macrae & Zwi (1992) at 316.
[45] John Ryle and David Keen, prospectus for a conference on "The Fate of Information in the Disaster Zone," September 27, 1995.
[46]Helen Young and Suzanne Jaspars, Nutrition Matters--People, Food, and Famine (Intermediate Technology Publications, 1995).
[47]*SEOC Review (1995) at 125-27.*
[48]*SEOC Review (1995) at 125-27 (quoting A. De Waal (1990) A reassessment of entitlement theory in the light of recent famines in Africa, 21 Development and Change* 469).
[49]SEOC Review (1995) at 185.
[50]SEOC Review (1995) at 132.
[51] *Andrew Natsios, "The Politics of U.S. Disaster Response," **Mediterranean Quarterly**, Spring 1995, 48.*
[52]Adams & Bradbury (1995) at 33-34.
[53]*Refugee Policy Group.*
[54] *AICF survey data, May 1995.*
[55]*Colin Scott, Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Action and Security in Liberia (Providence: Watson Institute, 1995).*
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[57] *Mark Duffield and John Prendergast (2), Without Troops and Tanks: Humanitarian Intervention in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Red Sea Press, Trenton, 1994.*
[58]B. Hendrie, Cross-border Operations in Eritrea and Tigray, *Disasters* 13 at 351-60.
[59]*Andrew Natsios, "Humanitarian Relief Intervention in Somalia: The Economics of Chaos," Princeton conference paper, March 16, 1995, 10.*
[60]SEOC Review (1995) at 139.
[61]*SEOC Review (1995) at 101 (citing similar observation in Mozambican and Liberian conflicts in R. Green, Food and Famine* (mimeo, IDS, 1992)).
[62] *John Sommer, Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia, 1990-94, Refugee Policy Group, 1994.*
[63]SEOC Review (1995) at 142.
[64]Mark Duffield, Protracted Political Crisis, discussion paper for "Aid Under Fire," at Wilton Park, UK April 1995, 2.
[65] *Roberta Cohen, "Put Refugee Women in Charge of Food Distribution," in Bread for the World, Countries in Crisis, 1995, 35.*
[66]*Kevin Ashley and Jason Matus "Some Notes on Relief Distribution in Sudan," unpublished paper, 1.*
[67]*WFP (1995) at 1.*
[68] *Ashley and Matus, paper, 3.*

[69]*WFP (1995) at 5.*
[70]World Disasters Report 1994.
[71]John Prendergast, "Humanitarian Intervention and Crisis Response in the Horn," Center of Concern Discussion Paper, January 1995.
[72] Interview, 9/25/95.
[73]See UNICEF, "Chronic Emergency in Angola," 1991, 12.
[74]Adams & Bradbury (1995) at 47-48.
[75] Mary Anderson, "Development and the Prevention of Humanitarian Emergencies," in Weiss and Minear, Humanitarianism Across Borders, Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, 1993, 26.
[76]Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community, 1995, 195.
[77]Minear & Weiss (1995) at 89.
[78] Simon Simonse, "Human Rights and Cultural Values in Relief Operations in Wartorn South Sudan," mimeo, January 12, 1995, 5.
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[80]Macrae & Zwi (1992) at 315.
[81]D. Keen & K. Wilson (1994) "Engaging with Violence: A Reassessment of Relief in Wartime" in J. Macrae & A. Zwi, eds., *War & Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies*, 217.
[82] Alex de Waal, "Emergency Work in the Nuba Mountains, Sudan," Abstract for European Working Group on the Horn conference, September 1995, 2.
[83] Natsios, 50.
[84]*SEOC Review (1995) at 241.*
[85]Andrew Natsios, "The Politics of United States Disaster Response," Mediterranean Quarterly 6, no.2 (spring 1995): 57.
[86] *Norman Barth (1991), "Tough Love" in the Horn of Africa? in Life & Peace Review*, vol. 5 no.1, 25-26.
[87] *SEOC Review (1995) at 24 (citing M. Duffield and J. Prendergast, Without Troops or Tanks: Humanitarian Intervention in Eritrea and Ethiopia* (1994).
[88] *John Prendergast, "Tie Humanitarian Assistance to Substantive Reform," **The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs**, July/August 1995, 42.*